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​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

According to the World Bank indicators, the Maghreb youth unemployment rate is among the highest in the world. After the Arab Spring uprisings (2011), the youth aspirations and expectations clashed with the economic difficulties and political reality in the Maghreb countries, which are unable to provide employment opportunities and efficient solutions to youth major problems. In the light of this situation, we analyzed (using quantitative methods) the satisfaction degree of young people under the effect of economic challenges and political transformations in the Maghreb region. It is clear from the results that the Maghreb youth adhere more to the economic priority, despite other priorities related to administrative corruption, the lack of public services, the fight against terrorism and insecurity. The second conclusion is that the youth economic expectations create a kind of homogeneity in this region. In all the observed countries, most young people consider the economy as the first priority, as well as the entire population.

This article is an attempt to study the legitimization of the Moroccan political system by constitutional jurisprudence, considered as a concrete process within the science of constitutional law, and a social field that has witnessed struggles over epistemic authority. The structure and dynamism of this scientific field, and the appropriate political context, led to its transition from profane thought to traditionalism in the wake of the conservative revolution spearheaded by moroccan young researchers. This revolution, which constituted the kingdom of the constitutionalists, will shift from a counter field to a hegemonic one. This enabled the pioneers of traditionalism to participate in the process of legitimizing the political system in Morocco, through the production of constitutional documents broadcast and infused in symbolic violence through the constitutional lesson that will turn them, with the backing of the constitutional document and academic mentoring, into a scientific habitus.

Despite the state attracting considerable attention as a topic of study from Arab thinkers and intellectuals since the 19th century, the study of individual-level orientations toward the state using survey data has remained relatively marginal, both in English and in Arabic scholarship. Indeed, we still do not know much about Arab citizens' positions toward many of the debates that have long been present in Arab intellectual circles regarding the ontological nature of the so-called "Arab state" and the preferable ideological form it should take. This study seeks to fill this gap by focusing on the post-2011 period. It analyses how Arab citizens understand the state, the extent to which they distinguish it from the ruling regime, their orientations toward the ideological debate around the unified Arab state versus the nation-state, as well as around the religious Islamist state versus the civil state. It also examines the individual-level determinants of these orientations.

This paper seeks to ascertain the extent of positive Arab public attitudes—or lack thereof—towards the Arab popular revolutions, after more than a year since the revolutions first broke out. The results show an overall positive attitude towards the Arab revolutions among the Arab public. When asked to provide reasons for their positive disposition towards the revolutions, respondents spoke of an "Arab Awakening" which laid the foundations for democratic governance in the Arab region by restoring the democratic rights of Arab citizens. Opposition to the Arab revolutions and their impacts accounted for only 25% of Arab public opinion. A majority of respondents who disapproved of the Arab revolutions blamed the failure of these popular movements to achieve their aims, as well as the resulting economic and political instability. In addition to broad overall support for the Arab revolutions, the Arab public credits the recent revolutions with improved treatment of the public by the police and other government officials in the Arab region.

​This article discusses relations between Sudan and Iran against the background of the many Israeli air strikes against Sudan, and asks whether the ruling regime in Sudan favors Iran over the Arab states when it comes to dealing with its political and security concerns, or whether Sudan sees no issue in playing both sides. It also examines the dreams of Islamic leadership and the transnational revolutionary tendency espoused by Hassan al-Turabi, and the effect of this among his disciples in terms of their view of and links with Iran. The study also takes Iranian support for Islamic movements in Gaza via Sudan as an example of cooperation where the tactical and short term intersects with long term strategy. The paper also discusses the Islamists’ coming to power as a result of the Arab revolutions, and the potential for the revival of transnational revolution included in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and the effect of this on relations between the Arab states and their collective and individual relations with Iran.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

Beginning with a review of existing theories of international relations that discuss policies of penetration, this study examines current politics of the Arab regional order. Four different aspects of penetration are reviewed, including intra-Arab threats, rivalry between Arab states to occupy a central position, historical legacy, and multinational companies. The role of Arab elites in processes of penetration by means of their links with international powers and interests is also considered. The study looks at ‘soft’ penetration through an analysis of language, education, media, and civil society organizations, as well as “blatant penetration” like the occupation of Iraq and the spread of foreign military bases. Beyond Arab state actions, the paper also considers intervention by neighboring regional states. The paper finds that variation in the development of political, social, and economic systems has a corresponding influence on the levels of foreign penetration, infiltration, or influence. It also finds that analyzing the Arab region as a single regional system reveals a deep level of military, social, and economic penetration on all levels.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.