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Why did the January 25, 2011 revolution in Egypt descend into a state of violent oppression of the revolutionaries on the grounds of securing stability and fighting terrorism? This paper examines how the manner in which regime change took place following the January 25 revolution impacted on the democratic transition and its trajectory. The author looks specifically at those transformations which served to divert the course of revolutionary momentum, turning an uprising previously centered on "democratization" in the broadest sense, including the change in the system of government and the protection of personal and social liberties, into a movement which is often described in academic literature as an "electoral revolution". In other words, revolutionary momentum was focused exclusively on procedural questions and the filling of vacant executive and legislative positions following the collapse of the Mubarak regime before the more fundamental precursors to democracy could be established. This first transformation took place before the "electoral revolution" was itself diverted into a "counter revolution" which targeted all of the revolutionary forces behind the original uprising, making way for the establishment of a totalitarian mode of government.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.

This paper shall explore the historic shift in relations which has brought Russia and Turkey closer together, with a focus on the domains in which these two powers now cooperate. It shall examine in particular the impact of this new level of cooperation on their policies in the Arab region. The specific set of economic and political circumstances prevailing at the beginning of the twenty-first century have driven Russia and Turkey to revisit the nature of their centuries-long relations, which have previously been dominated by conflict and competition for influence. As two neighboring, great powers both of which are looking to adopt a new strategy to reclaim their imperial pasts on the world stage, Russia and Turkey are now compelled to cooperate, particularly in the economic domain. Yet even as the shared interests of these two countries expand, it has not brought an end to their contradictory sets of regional alliances in the Middle East which have placed them in a zero-sum game.

A convergence of interests between the Houthi militia and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh have served to undermine the National Dialogue for the country, which had earlier formed an implementation mechanism for the GCC Initiative. Previously, the aims of that Dialogue were intended to further the cause of a federalist, democratic state which decentralized power. This would have changed the status quo, in which power was concentrated in what Yemenis call the “Holy Center”, a tribalist-sectarian concentration of political and financial power which been in place for a millennium and which survived into the reborn, unified and modern-day Yemen of 1994.

This paper seeks to uncover the roles played by truth commissions in Latin America in establishing transitional justice, in a comparative study that draws upon three main experiences: Argentina, Chile, and Peru. It highlights the contexts that allowed these experiences to adhere to the democratic transformation and absorb its complexities, by questioning the dynamics that accompanied the establishment of truth commissions, and identifying the roles of actors in managing tension between the demands of victims and the requirements of reconciliation and civil peace. The paper demonstrates that the establishment of truth commissions was linked to the nature of the challenges faced by Latin countries undergoing democratization and transcending the legacy of previous violations. Inasmuch as these challenges reduced the crisis of legitimacy that ravaged these systems and led them to engage in this transformation, they also highlighted the potential that these committees have provided for actors to manage the sequence of this shift.

​This article analyses the development of civil-military relations in Ethiopia and how they are affected by politics, culture and ethnicity whilst drawing on compatibility theory. It explores a fundamental issue: to what extent does ethnic and cultural diversity influence civil-military relations in Ethiopia? The article begins with the hypothesis that the military's interests and political affiliations arise from their vision of the nation-state's interest, and may conflict with the attitudes of civil institutions, complicating the separation between civil and military institutional mandates. The article demonstrates how the social structure and distribution of tribes has had an impact on the reform processes of successive political systems in Ethiopia. Moreover, it concludes that consensus in civil-military relations and civilian control of government will continue in the future if slogans of centralization and citizenship are actualized through legal and democratic methods based on the principles of justice and equality in rights and duties among all constituents.

Palestine Over Two Months 1/5-30/6/2020

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This study discusses successive Palestinian governments and provides a reading of their features, focusing on the 15th, 16th and 17th governments, five years after Rami Hamdallah became prime minister. The first section examines the emergence and development of governments since 1994. The second section gives an overview of the three cabinets in question and their agendas while the third section examines the failures of these governments and the impact of that failure on the Palestinian political scene. The final section examines the traditional operating assumptions of the political system. The study argues that the origin of the problem lies in the political system that has emerged since 1994 which restricts the operations of Palestinian governments, and that the formation of "technocratic" cabinets has only exacerbated the Palestinian political crisis.

This paper explores the decision by the Egyptian government to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. One outcome of this new designation is that an Egyptian law covering terrorist organizations will apply to the country’s largest political party, one which had taken control of nearly 40% of seats in the (now disbanded) People’s Assembly, and more than one-quarter of votes cast in the first round of presidential elections (held in May, 2012).