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Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This study attempts to understand the concept of the "deep state" given its increasing use in political literature and analysis. This happens especially in comparative studies and, specifically, when multiple political systems are addressed. Through an analysis of the literature in which the term is used, it is clear that the concept of the "deep state" is ambiguously understood and applied. This study is based on a critical view of the concept. It assumes that the vagueness of its definition is tinged with secrecy. Its fragmented usage in a variety of political systems (democratic, semi-democratic and authoritarian), render it an analytical tool that is not useful nor capable to expand knowledge of comparative political science. In lieu of this hypothesis, the study reveals discrepancies in the usage of the concept of "deep state", in an attempt to refine the concept.

The 2011 Arab uprisings sparked hopes for positive change in the regional politics of the Middle East. The uprisings not only challenged the authority of states at the domestic level but seemed poised to disrupt regional geopolitics and alter the position of the Middle East in the international system. With the outbreak of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the unprecedented proliferation of armed non- state actors in the region, the uprisings seem to drive important changes in the nature of the state and its regional and international role. Despite its artificial inception and its puzzling survival throughout the 20 th century, the Arab State faces challenges in the post- 2011 era and its vulnerabilities have been exposed. While the uprisings may have weakened Arab states, changes at regional and international levels created permissive conditions to challenge the regional state system. Hamas's 7 October 2023 operation and Israel's ensuing wars in the region have further exacerbated state erosion and reinvigorated post- 2011 regional dynamics. This paper examines how structural international and regional conditions have reshaped statehood and agency in the region post- 2011. It also explores how the responses of Arab states to international conditions and the regional reverberations of the uprisings have further generated disintegrative effects for the Arab state.

The wave of democracy, peaceful or violent, has up till now dispelled many of the illusions prevalent in the West, in Europe especially, including so-called "Arab exceptionalism"—that is the notion that Arabs are not interested in democracy, are indifferent to whether it is present in their lives or not, and are basically not ready for it. A second dismantled illusion is that of the "good dictator" that is based on the claim that dictators loyal to the West are a better bet than the Islamist alternative. A third illusion concerns the idea that the Arab world is itself a construct and that the attractiveness of a supranational Arab identity has gone. The Arab revolutions, however, have proved the above theories wrong. It is not a coincidence that the wave for change broke out in a number of Arab states at the same time and in the same fashion with more or less the same slogans shouted out in the same language, and were able in a very short time to bring down four regimes. The Arab revolutions took academic circles by surprise and made some academics claim that understanding the future of Middle East politics required that academics carry out a serious reassessment of the restored importance of Pan-Arab identity.

​​​AI technologies are drawing increasing attention among international relations (IR) scholars. Ingvild Bode reviews this literature through considering, in particular, the extent to which such literature continues to use or expand on well-traded analytical frameworks. She finds that scholarship on AI in IR can look back at a longer-than-expected trajectory and centres on four key themes: the balance of power; disinformation; governance; and ethics. Much of this literature works with well-established IR conceptualisations, while studies across three emerging themes – (re)conceptualising technology, beyond the AI arms race, and unpacking relevant actors – push and expand established disciplinary frameworks​.​​

The study presents the problems of structural politicization in political studies, and the danger of methodological debates transforming into political confrontations, a situation that has been repeated in the ongoing debate between the advocates and opponents of secularism. The study demonstrated that the necessity of the political dimension, and/or the political dependencies of every "scientific" approach to politics does not necessarily mean acceptance of unrestricted politicization. It is possible to acknowledge the political content of treatment without slipping into politicization. From this standpoint, criticism of underlying or structural politicization, as in Edward Said's criticism of Orientalism and Western Centralism, cannot be compared to the way that Israel's supporters crudely politicize US Middle East studies in their battle to hold it hostage to the interests of Israel and the extreme right. In the same vein, the study critically addresses the opinion that "area studies" in political science is marked by theoretical poverty and academic inferiority. The study itself leans towards the opinion that so called "theoretical studies" are in fact "area studies" that take western countries as the testing ground for political experiences and seek to generalize the results in the form of "theories" that enjoy universal validity.

Book Title: The Revenge of Geography [English]

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.