Latest Articles

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

Scholarship explains impediments to democratic transition in Middle Eastern countries as forms of neopatrimonialism - a combination of patrimonial tradition and cosmetic electoral procedures. However, this approach conflates two spheres of governance: firstly, the government as a sphere of appointed or elected politicians, secondly, the state's bureaucracy as a sphere of administrative staff necessary for the government to execute its planned actions. The impediments Hamas governments (2006-2007) faced highlight the difference between the two spheres. Accordingly, I conceptually differentiate between two types of government: government in office and government in power. While the Hamas government was supposed to rule, the administrative personnel refused to comply. Thus, the elected government in office faced local-institutional and external constraints which prevented its functioning, and provoked power struggles that led to internecine war and the collapse of the electoral democracy.

ﺗﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺮض اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ا ﻟﺰاﻣﻴﺔ وﺧﻄﻮات ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دولٍ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻟﺪول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ؛ ﻗﻄﺮ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، واﻟﺘﻲ أﻋﺎدت ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ دام ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻋﺎﻣًﺎ. وﺗﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ اﻟﻬﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﺒﺎب، وﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻴﺤﻪ ﻟﻘﻮات اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎط ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺖ ﻣﺆﺧﺮًا أﻛﺜﺮ ﻧﺸﺎﻃ ﺎ ﺧﺎرج ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ، ﻓﻀﻠ ﺎ ﻋﻦ أن اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻄﺐ وﻳﺪرب ﺷﺒﺎﻧ ﺎ ﻏﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﺘﻘﺮون إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢ، وﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮن ﻋﺎﻃﻠﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻣﻌﺘﻠﻲ اﻟﺼﺤﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻣﺎرات، اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ. This article explores the introduction and implementation of mandatory military service, in three of the six Gulf monarchies that constitute the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Two of these states, Qatar and the UAE, have never before imposed conscription while the third, Kuwait, decided to reintroduce it after a fifteen-year hiatus. The new policy, the essay argues, has been motivated by several reasons. First, conscription will build up the reserve forces of these states that have recently become more active in projecting military power beyond their borders. Second, it will strengthen national identity and the political socialization of young men and, to a lesser extent, women. Third, it will engage and train often poorly educated, unemployed, and unhealthy youths. Finally, the article contends, there is little chance of compulsory military service being introduced in the other three GCC states.

The phenomenon of armed groups operating in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula is a growing one. This paper presents the history of this phenomenon as well as factors leading up to the violent encounters with state forces from former president Hosni Mubarak to Mohamad Morsi and the military coup led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It examines different factors that led to the severe clash between groups and state forces, and the causes that saw the clash become widespread and even violent. The paper examines the role of state forces in escalating the conflict, and takes into account the religious authorities that these groups stem from, as well as the factors that affected their political views. It further examines what seemed an Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and efforts at coordination to fight these groups. Based on personal interviews of groups in the Sinai and collected testimonies, the paper makes a core contribution to understanding the current events in the Sinai and their wider political context. ​

The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

This study reviews the various Syrian military groups currently active against the Syrian regime, and discusses the circumstances that led to their formation as well as their intellectual and political orientations, links, and funders. The study sees that in general these groups can be divided into two main currents: one with a secular orientation and one with an Islamist orientation. It argues that these military groups were formed spontaneously, in response to the violence of the regime, rather than as an intentional political act. In addition, uneducated sectors were confronted with the task of forming most of the leaderships of these military groups and actually leading them, which helped make their visions lack clarity. This study is a contribution toward filling the gap in Arab academic research on armed Syrian opposition forces.

ﺗﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒُﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ا دوار اﻟﺘﻲ اﺿﻄﻠﻌﺖ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ اﺟﺘﺎﺣﺘﻬﺎ رﻳﺎح اﻟﺜﻮرات؛ إذ ﻧﻠﺤَﻆ أن اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺮ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺻﻄﻔﺖ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺎﻧﺒﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻘﻮات ﻧﺠﺤﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﻮغ ﻣﺮادﻫﺎ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺘﻄﻊ اﻟﺸﻌﻮب اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺪﻋﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﺼﻤﻮد ﻓﻲ وﺟﻪ ﻗﻤﻊ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻴﺔ. إن ا دوار اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﺧﺬت اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺗﺆدﻳﻬﺎ اﻟﻴﻮم ﻻ ﺗﺆﻛﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﻴﻮش وأﻫﻤﻴﺘﻬﺎ وﺣﺴْ ﺐ، وﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﺤﺚ أﻳﻀ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺻﻼح اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان. وﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﺳﺆال إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ واﻟﺪﻓﺎع ﻳﺒﺮز ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﺠﺎوﺑًﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ. وﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻃﺎر، ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﺻﻼح اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻣﻨﻲ واﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي ﻓﻲ دول اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻟﺠﻴﻮش اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، إﺻﻼح ﻗﻄﺎع اﻣﻦ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. This paper explores the military aspect of the Arab Spring, and specifically the role played by formal armies in the Arab Spring states. Specifically, this paper focuses on the fact that popular revolutions during the Arab Spring were successful in those countries in which the military sided with the protestors, whereas revolutionary momentum could not face down the regimes in those countries where the armies did not side with the revolution. The political functions which Arab armies carry out serve to highlight not only their significance and effectiveness as institutions, but also the need for military reform. The question of military and security sector reform has become increasingly pressing in the post-Arab Spring transitional phase, driving the author to probe the structural aspects of reform to the military and security sectors of the Arab Spring states.

This study examines the explanatory power of realism in the context of the Grand Renaissance Dam crisis between Egypt and Ethiopia, drawings on concepts from deterrence theory, and the counter hegemonic challenges posed by revisionist states. It adopts a broader understanding of hegemony incorporating the concept of hydro- hegemony, where Ethiopia's behaviour is seen as a direct challenge to Egypt's established hegemony in the Nile Basin. The study concludes that the dam crisis illustrates both the strength and weaknesses of the realist perspective. On one hand, it affirms realist assumptions regarding the significance of power dynamics, alliance building, conflict of interests, relative gains, and the influence of the international system on state behavior. Conversely, the crisis also reveals the limitations of realism, particularly its to overlook internal factors and the importance of non-material sources of power in advancing states' interests and reinforcing their hegemony.

By analysing qualitative and archival primary sources, this paper examines intra-military relations in Syria during the period in which Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (1961 - 1963). It explores the consequences of the failure to apply what can be described as "Concordance Theory", particularly regarding the impact of military divisions on civil-military relations, and how these divisions led to dangerous fragmentation within the military institution itself. Additionally, it examines the role these divisions played in the disintegration of the political system during the secession, without neglecting the social and political conditions that influenced these developments. The paper highlights the emergence of the Damascene 'Shwam' officers' faction as a result of policies aimed at containing and dismantling military factions during the unity period, and how this faction managed to lead the secession coup. It also analyses how this elite failed to maintain control over the army and government institutions, with their efforts to assert control giving rise to competing coup factions, ultimately leading to the collapse of military leadership and the loss of command and control. This paved the way for the military coup on 8 March 1963.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.