Latest Articles

A recent opinion poll by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies examined Arab public attitudes towards US foreign policy during the first year of the Trump presidency. Survey questions sought to ascertain Arab public perceptions of Trump based on a number of key indicators. Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate specific Trump Administration policies relevant to the Arab region, including support for democracy, the approach to the Iranian nuclear deal and the combatting of extremism and terrorism. Finally, the survey included questions on how respondents viewed Trump’s policies towards a number of specific sites of conflict: Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Palestine.

ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺤﺪدات اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ اﻳﺮاﻧﻲ ﻣﻦ ا زﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮاﻣﻲ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻨﻊ أيّ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻐﺮاﻓﻴﺎ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻜﺎﺳﺐ ﻃﻬﺮان ﻣﻦ اﺳﺘﻤﺮار ا زﻣﺔ ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﺧﺴﺎرة اﻟﺮﻳﺎض ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﻠﻔﺎﺋﻬﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ وﺧﺎرﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، وﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﺴﺎﺋﺮﻫﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ أﻳﻀ - ﺎ ﻟﻮ ﻃﺎل أﻣﺪ ازﻣﺔ أو اﺗﺠﻬﺖ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻤﺆﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﻟﻰ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻬﺎ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺘﺪﺧﻞ ا ﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ - ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى. وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺼﻮﻣﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، ﺗﻤﻴﻞ دواﺋﺮ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﺪة ﻓﻲ ﻃﻬﺮان إﻟﻰ اﺗﺨﺎذ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ ﺣﺬر ﻣﻦ ازﻣﺔ، ﺧﺸﻴﺔ ﺗﺒﻌﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ وإﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻤﻮﻗﻒ؛ إذ ﻻ ﺗﺒﺪو إﻳﺮان اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ وﺿﻊ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﺟﻴﺪ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﺠﻦ ﻣﻜﺎﺳﺐ ﺗﺬﻛﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻨﻮوي ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻤﻨ ﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ. ﻟﺬﻟﻚ، رﺑﻤﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺨﺮاط ﻓﻲ أزﻣﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة، ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ وﺟﻮد إدارة أﻣﻴﺮﻛﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﺎﺻﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺪاء وﺗﻔﺮض ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮﺑﺎت. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، إﻳﺮان، ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، ﺗﺮاﻣﺐ. This paper explores the determinants of Iran's stance towards the 2017 intra-GCC Crisis, in which the country opposes alterations to the political geography of the Gulf. The author demonstrates how Tehran simultaneously benefits from the loss of Saudi Arabia of some of its allies and stands to lose from increased American involvement in the event that the conflict is prolonged. Despite its long-standing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, many Iranian decision-makers are cautious with regards to the intra-GCC crisis, fearing the possible regional or global fallout of a more involved role. Lacking tangible benefits from the nuclear deal with the P51+ group of countries, official Iran seems reluctant to involve itself in a crisis which could complicate both its domestic political situation and its foreign relations, especially in light of a hostile US Administration.

In redefining central concepts and causal relations, this paper takes a fresh look at the conflict between armed groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the US-led international alliance. Analysis begins with the hypothesis that “foreign intervention leads to extremism” and goes on to examine its opposite, that “extremism leads to foreign intervention.” In exploring this mutual correlation – regardless of its validity – the paper finds limited analytical space to understand the nature and terms of the current conflict, and thus redefines this relation in a way that puts “foreign intervention” and “extremism” in an alternative conceptual framework. This framework becomes one of “re-regionalization,” and offers new possibilities for understanding the current conflict.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

​This study explores the concept of a traditional balance of power based on realism, which, for several reasons, is unsuitable to explain the relations between the US and the Gulf States. First, competition between the main regional powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, is not characterized of direct confrontation, but rather manifests through proxy interference in civil war-torn countries (Syria, Yemen, and Iraq). Second, since the greatest threat to the region that has resulted from this competition is an unintended escalation, the final endgame must be collective security and stability, not a balance of power. Third, balance of power in the conventional sense is unrealistic given the actual quantitative and qualitative conventional military superiority of the GCC countries compared to Iran's military capacity.

This study deals with transnational Shiism and the dynamics of relations between the Shiʿi religious establishment and the post-colonial state in Iraq. It sheds light on two aspects of transnational Shiism. First, the evolution and internal dynamics of religious authority, especially in terms of adapting its transnational domain to the Iraqi national context. The study argues that the relationship between Shiʿi religious establishment and the state was often characterized by tension, as the state sought to consolidate its power within its borders. Yet, after 2003, the nature of relations between the two has significantly changed, leading to new configurations of authority. Second, the increasing polarization between activist transnational Shiism, which is today led by the Iranian state, and Iraq-centric Shiism became a key factor in shaping power relations in post-2003 Iraq.

This article discusses the challenges facing the government of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq, and outlines what ought to be expected in the coming stage, particularly after the fall of Mosul to ISIL. The paper reviews the failure of the regime post 2002 to insure equal participation of all segments of Iraq in the institution of power following the sectarian polices adopted by Nouri al-Maliki who exercised control over all the levers of the political regime and the public political institutions, and systematically harassed other politicians and parties – Sunnis in particular. The paper also reviews the American position, the intervention of the international coalition, and the establishment of the national guard. It looks at the other challenges facing the effort to keep Iraq together and help it emerge from its problems, including the threat of ISIL, sectarian division, the security situation, and the economy. The paper also reviews the regional overlap with the Iraqi situation, particularly the Iranian aspect, and what is transpiring as a new regional equation.

This article discusses the challenges facing the government of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq, and outlines what ought to be expected in the coming stage, particularly after the fall of Mosul to ISIL. The paper reviews the failure of the regime post 2002 to insure equal participation of all segments of Iraq in the institution of power following the sectarian polices adopted by Nouri al-Maliki who exercised control over all the levers of the political regime and the public political institutions, and systematically harassed other politicians and parties – Sunnis in particular. The paper also reviews the American position, the intervention of the international coalition, and the establishment of the national guard. It looks at the other challenges facing the effort to keep Iraq together and help it emerge from its problems, including the threat of ISIL, sectarian division, the security situation, and the economy. The paper also reviews the regional overlap with the Iraqi situation, particularly the Iranian aspect, and what is transpiring as a new regional equation.

In September 2018 it will have been thirteen years since the referendum on the reconciliation plan in Algeria. This paper considers the details and achievements of the plan by investigation of the concept and objectives of national reconciliation and the historical framework of the Algerian crisis, critiquing the plan in order to establish new horizons for reconciliation. It examines the historical context of Algeria's national reconciliation, and then the chronology of the path to national reconciliation. It then moves on to study the Algerian journey of reconciliation through a thorough reading of the draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Finally, the paper determines the extent of the advances made in establishing peace and coexistence in the Algerian homeland and also identifies some of the gaps in the reconciliation experience, and suggests ways to unlock potential achievements.