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India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

Today, India is actively engaged in projecting its influence beyond its geographic proximity. It has a proactive policy based on national interests and driven by its growing needs, particularly for energy imports, and an ambition to achieve a position of global prominence. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is of great geopolitical importance to India's strategy because of its geographic proximity, the abundance of energy resources, the great financial assets, and as the place with the largest Indian immigrant community. Nevertheless, many regional contenders may challenge India's interests in the region. This article discusses the geopolitical and economic importance of the GCC states and their current position in India's strategy. It explores the driving forces behind novel strategic partnerships between them. It also analyses how third-party relations with the GCC states or India may affect their relationships, such as China, Pakistan, and Iran. It also focuses on the new containment policy of India and China and their geopolitical contest over the Gulf and the GCC's hydrocarbon and financial assets.

This study adopts the regulatory state thesis to highlight the changes that have occurred in the economic and social role of the state and then the way in which public policy problems are addressed. The discussion focused on the regulatory policies of the telecommunications sectors following the economic liberalization of these markets and their opening to competition, through examining three cases in the Arab region: Egypt, the UAE and Qatar. The study is based on the hypothesis that the shift in the role of the state from the welfare state model, whereby the state and its institutions played the main role in the operations of providing communications services, to the regulatory state model, whereby the country adopts strategies to liberalize those markets, has necessitated making room for non-state actors to play an expanding role as a telecommunications service provider and operator. At the same time, the state has become the regulator that controls the behavior of new actors by designing regulations and legislation that control the rhythm of service delivery processes in liberalized telecom markets, in a manner that guarantees the quality of the services provided, and in a way that benefits the users.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

This study explores the challenges facing Indian foreign policy in West Asia, especially the attempt to balance the forces in the Arab Region in light of competition between West Asian states to spread their influence. It argues that Arab countries have demonstrated a willingness to see India undertake a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in the region. But Indian strategies seem limited, not only requiring bilateral collaboration, but also to rationalize their competitive relations at the regional and global levels. The study argues that India must redraw its strategic vision of the region, as well as its regional and global partnerships with China, Pakistan, Russia and the United States, a process that will undoubtedly have repercussions for India's traditional reluctant West Asia policy.

اﺗﺴﻤﺖ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ازﻣﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وا ﻣﺎرات واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪوء واﻟﺜﻘﺔ واﻻﺗﺰان. وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺐ أن ﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻘﻄﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ا زﻣﺔ، ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﺠﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻣﺮورًا ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺮﻣﺠﺔ، ﻣﻦ دون اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ "ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ". وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر ﻗﺪ ﺧﻄﻄﺖ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ا زﻣﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﻨﺢ اﻟﻈﻼم، ﻓﺠﺮ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮب "اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﻊ واﻟﺼﺪﻣﺔ" اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻓﺈن ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻣﺘﺼﺎص "اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ اوﻟﻰ"، ﺑﻼ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺄة. وﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ داء اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ وردة ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ إزاء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﻨﻌﻄﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ ازﻣﺔ، ﻳُﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗ ﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﻬﺪوء، واﻟﺜﻘﺔ، واﻻﺗﺰان، اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺴﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ اداء اﻟﻘﻄﺮي، وﻫﺬه اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻫﻲ: ﺳﻘﻮط ﻋﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﺟﺄة، وﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ "اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ"، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ، وارﺗﺒﺎك اﻟﺨﺼﻢ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴّﺔ، اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ، اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ. Since the outbreak of the crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on 24 May 2017, Qatar's diplomacy has been characterised by calm, confidence and balance. The observer can't understand the diplomatic approach of Qatar in dealing with all stages of the crisis - from explosion to siege, through state-orchestrated media campaigns - without knowing the "behind the scenes" facts. Blockading countries planned to blow the crisis up under the cover of darkness, before the dawn of May 24. But Qatar was, unsurprisingly, able to absorb the "shock and awe" first strike. Five factors characterise the country's diplomatic performance as it has reacted to developments and turning points in the crisis: The failure of the 'element of surprise', years of building Qatar's "nation brand", Qatar's arsenal of "soft power", international alliances, and the opponents' quandary.

The 2011 Arab uprisings sparked hopes for positive change in the regional politics of the Middle East. The uprisings not only challenged the authority of states at the domestic level but seemed poised to disrupt regional geopolitics and alter the position of the Middle East in the international system. With the outbreak of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the unprecedented proliferation of armed non- state actors in the region, the uprisings seem to drive important changes in the nature of the state and its regional and international role. Despite its artificial inception and its puzzling survival throughout the 20 th century, the Arab State faces challenges in the post- 2011 era and its vulnerabilities have been exposed. While the uprisings may have weakened Arab states, changes at regional and international levels created permissive conditions to challenge the regional state system. Hamas's 7 October 2023 operation and Israel's ensuing wars in the region have further exacerbated state erosion and reinvigorated post- 2011 regional dynamics. This paper examines how structural international and regional conditions have reshaped statehood and agency in the region post- 2011. It also explores how the responses of Arab states to international conditions and the regional reverberations of the uprisings have further generated disintegrative effects for the Arab state.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.