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This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

​The splitting, renaming and merging of factions can lead to the start of new rivalries, or in some cases, end existing ones. A new faction may inherit the original faction's previous rivalries with other groups, and if a faction name change results in a total restructure, it may signal the end of the rivalry. However, this was not the case when Jabhat al-Nusra renamed itself Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and later Tahrir al-Sham. It was considered a 'cosmetic' and superficial change because it did not develop a new structure. This article will shed light on exclusionary politics and the political ramifications of sectarianism caused by certain jihadist movements, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (presently known as Tahrir al-Sham), enabling us to analyse its practices, especially towards minorities, and sectarian ideologies present in Idlib, and which ultimately led to the expulsion of many who fled outside the governorate. The article also calls attention to the roles of regional and international powers in Idlib against the backdrop of opposition factions, and their physical and ideological influence on Islamist forces that frequently facilitated displacement within and outside the city.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

ﻓﻲ ﺧﻀﻢ اﺧﺬ واﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤّﻰ إﻋﻼﻣﻴًﺎ "ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ"، ﺑﻴﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ا رﺑﻊ؛ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻃﺮق ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. وﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﺧﺘﻼط اوراق ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪ، اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺐ؛ ن ﺛﻤﺔ "ﺗﺸﺎﺑﻜ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، و"اﺷﺘﺒﺎﻛ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى، وﺛﻤﺔ "إﺟﻬﺎض" ﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ ﻋﺮﺑﻲﱟ ﻣﺄﻣﻮلٍ، وﺛﻤﺔ دﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮرﻳﺔ ﺿﺎرﺑﺔ ﺟﺬورﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ، وﻫﻨﺎك ﻗﻮى ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎوﻫﺎم، وأﻃﺮوﺣﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺼﺮ. ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ وﺻﻒ اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ارﺑﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﺎد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻌﺾ أنّ ﻛﻞ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ أﺻﺒﺢ وراء اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ، وﺗﻢّ ﺗﺠﺎوزه ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ أﺣﺪﺛﻬﺎ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ، وﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺪد ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﺪة أﺷﺪ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن، ارﻫﺎب. This paper will attempt to approach the present crisis between Qatar and a group of four countries formed of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt from a number of perspectives. The complexity of the present situation means that a process of deconstruction is required before the problem can be solved. Specifically, the present crisis reveals how the countries involved are both intertwined and in conflict, simultaneously; and how the players in question are in conflict over attempts to undo the Arab Spring. The conflicts between Qatar and the remaining countries have roots which stretch into history, and they also demonstrate that any belief that the birth of the modern nation-state would end those rivalries was misguided.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

Book Title: Egypt and its Islamists After the January 25 Revolution [Arabic]

Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood had held sit-ins outside the Rab’a Adawiya Mosque, on the edge of a Square located in the Nasr City district east of Cairo, before the forced dispersal by Egyptian security forces led to a massacre on August 2. Using aerial footage, Human Rights Watch estimated that 85,000 protestors were gathered at the square before the massacre. The steps taken to disperse the crowds had totally contradicted assurances by the Egyptian authorities, for example that the process would be gradual; that a security cordon would allow for the safe passage of women and children in particular; and that protestors would have sufficient warning to leave. Clearly, the massacre illustrates that the Egyptian authorities failed miserably in their duty to ensure that any loss of life resulting from the dispersal was kept to a bare minimum. This paper makes use of the evidence documented by Human Rights Watch on the events surrounding the dispersal of the Rab’a Square, concentrating on three main points: the violence of some of the protestors; the high death toll resulting from the dispersal; unjustified killings of protestors; and the lack of any safe exit routes for the protestors.

This paper seeks to understand the reason behind Egyptian political parties having resorted to popular protests as a tool of political action, as opposed to conventional means of political action available to formal political groupings, such as electoral competition. It also goes on to highlight the reasons which drive Egyptian political parties to adopt exclusionist rhetoric. Based on public opinion gained from the Arab Opinion Index, this paper argues that the resorting of Egyptian political parties to protests and exclusionist political rhetoric and tactics is rooted in a number of factors. These are largely due to the ineffectiveness of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency and the repeated political errors of the Muslim Brotherhood, all of which contribute to driving Egyptian political parties to other modes of action.

The conflict in Syria is rooted in its important geopolitical location and its significance in regional alliances and international rivalries. This paper argues that the Syrian Revolution, especially after its transition from non-violence to militarization, fell victim to an intense rivalry in the context of the game of nations over three things: the direction of the ongoing conflict, the future of the country, and its political orientation. Although the essence of the conflict has not changed much since the beginning of the crisis - both with respect to the objectives of local actors and the interests and alliances of influential powers - the regional context has seen important changes. Perhaps the most prominent of these are the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the return of the army to the political stage; the decline of Turkey’s regional status as a result of the setbacks faced by the leadership of the Justice and Development Party; and the possible predominance of pragmatic thinking in Iranian foreign policy after the presidential election in Iran. In addition, the Saudi decision to abandon its traditional caution and move toward a direct confrontation with the Iranian project in the region presents another momentous change. Amid this changing regional landscape, the Syrian crisis remains at a standstill - a military solution is not possible and a political solution is not viable - in the context of a state of regional and international polarization, and the absence of an effective international that will to put an end to this tragedy.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.