Latest Articles

Held by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies on June 2, 2014, this special one-day symposium examines the crisis in the Ukraine caused by Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the repercussions of this crisis on the Arab region.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

This research paper analyzes the internal and regional political context of the fifth Algerian presidential elections in an era of party pluralism. It observes the political phenomena witnessed during the elections by giving an interpretation of their political signification and their implication for a democratic transition. The author offers an analysis of the results and interprets the factors that governed the behavior of Algerian voters, who favored continuity over change.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is taken here as a nucleus for new policies and powerful alliances that seek to establish a new world order; an order where the organization acts as a main pillar of the international power balance. The SCO has transformed from a regional organization with a specific goal into an international one by shaping new positions distinct from those of the United States. This was demonstrated through the SCO’s position on Iran’s nuclear program, the Korean issue, the Syrian crisis, and security issues in central Asia. Since this new international organization includes two permanent members of the Security Council (Russia and China), as well as nuclear powers, such as India and Pakistan, as observers, a serious look at its program seems essential for projecting the outcome of recent shifts in world politics. This paper thus attempts to answer two central questions: How far can the SCO consolidate multipolarity in international relations away from US hegemony? How will this affect the international power balance?

Russia has not specified its national interests in the Middle East or the Arab World since the 1990s. This paper discusses Russia’s shift toward a more active and effective role in the Middle East, in particular after Vladimir Putin came to power. Putin’s attempts to strengthen Russia in the Middle East were driven by a mixture of nostalgia and strategic national interests. With the events of the Arab Spring, Russia sensed that Arab revolutions could result in geostrategic changes in the region, which may not comply with its growing ambitions. It is this background against which Russia’s different stances toward each Arab Spring country and the outcomes of their respective uprisings can be read. Putin expressed anti-change reservations in Libya and Egypt, and even more so in Syria, making it one of the major actors in the Syrian crisis. At the same time, however, Moscow had no strong stance on Yemen, Tunisia, or Bahrain. The motives behind Russia’s role can be understood through a look at its internal situation, which is being influenced by waves of democratic change in the Arab Region, as well as its impact on the future of Central Asian countries, particularly Russia’s allies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus). This paper discusses all of these entanglements in the context of the current Arab situation.

​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​This article traces the different paths taken by constructivism in International Relations, from its emergence as a critical social theory in the 1980s, in response to the third debate between positivist rationalists and post-positivist reflectivists, to Alexander Wendt's project to seize a middle ground and to bridge the rationalist–reflectivist epistemological gap. The article, then, examines the intra-debates among conventional and critical constructivists on Went's project, as well as the rise of the new constructivism after Wendt left the constructivist research program. The article explores the Wendtian project's epistemological tensions and demonstrates how such tensions led to a plurality within constructivism: modernist conventional and postmodernist critical (reflectivist). It highlights that Wendt's leaving constructivism and his shift to a quantum approach have not caused constructivism to decline, but instead, it continued to thrive through the efforts of a new generation of constructivists. The article argues that three main developments in International Relations over the past twenty years have contributed to its ongoing thriving: the decline of epistemological polarization among IR theories; the rise of critical realism as a philosophy of science in International Relations, and the emergence of analytical eclecticism.​

Where the Cold War crises took place in the context of a bilateral international system represented by the Western and Soviet entities, the recent Ukrainian crisis is played out on an international stage where the US remains the world’s unipolar power. This paper discusses the major differences between these contexts with the aim of better understanding the possible outcomes and ramifications of the crisis. Such an understanding seems vital, for if the Ukrainian crisis continues without reaching a political or diplomatic solution, the cost will be higher for Russia and EU countries than it will be for the United States. The paper shows how European countries will pay a higher price for the crisis, compared with others in the region with different foreign policy priorities due to the EU’s current political and economic interests that tie it to Russia.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

Following the ouster of President elect Mohamed Morsi after only one year in power, this paper looks at the future of elections in Egypt. Without any political party that holds the support of the masses, or the possibility of making up for this by building strong partisan alliances, the paper examines the rules of political practice and the nature of legislations based on the 2014 constitution in order to find a way forward amid a current deadlock. It finds a current legal and legislative condition that has restored Mubarak-era rules, characterized by weak partisan influence and a lack of the necessary political pluralism that accompanies democracy. It finds that, despite accelerating steps towards building partisan alliances and electoral consensuses, there are still structural obstacles hindering the establishment of a genuine parliamentary system, partly due to the weakness of political parties and the limitation of their legislative and procedural structure.

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.