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The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

In an effort to understand the characteristics of "virtual communities" and specifically "information societies," this study attempts to test the argument that virtual communities, with their networked structure, pose a challenge (or represent an alternative) to traditional hierarchical structures, due to the former's ability to self-organize, and settle their internal disputes without the need for authoritative intervention. The study uses the case study approach, applied to 3 Wikipedia's edit wars. The chosen cases are related to a number of Middle East informational crises. The study concludes that mechanisms of virtual societies (e.g. self-organization) can work efficiently in cases of limited disputes, but in cases of sharp disagreements, traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms that include authoritative intervention and exercising some form of power, in a "top-down" approach, remain essential for conflict resolution. This implies that the factor of "authority" remains significant even in the context of virtual communities.

​تعــرض هــذه الورقــة، أولًا، أحــدث الاتجاهات في الــرأي العام الفلســطيني، وتحلل هــذا الرأي تجــاه الحكومــة الحاليــة في الضفة الغربية. وتبحــث، ثانيًا، تأثير الاستقطاب في الرأي العام الفلســطيني. وتتنــاول، أخيــرًا، الــرأي العــام الفلســطيني فــي ما يتعلــق بمســتقبل القضية الفلسطينية.

The election of a president in Lebanon is an important event not because of the person or their powers—since indeed the role lost its power after the Taif Agreement—

This paper relies on the academic literature on rebel movements and armed rebellions to better the insurrection presently underway in the Egyptian provinces of the Sinai. The paper seeks to understand the implications for counter-insurgency policies, asking why the insurgency has proven so resilient, and at times expanded. The military capabilities and resources available to the militants will also be scrutinized, along with the Egyptian Army's blundering attempts at counterinsurgency and the prevailing political environment. The paper then moves to studying the tactical patterns and the overall strategy of the ISIL affiliated group active in the Sinai. The author concludes that the failure of counterinsurgency efforts, the continued absence of national reconciliation, the failure to review and revise counterinsurgency policies serve to make the Sinai region fertile ground for insurgents.

This paper presents Tunisian public opinion trends towards the country’s democratic experience, using data gathered by the ACRPS-published Arab Opinion Index, comparing the 2019/2020 results with previous polls. It also seeks to measure the popular reaction to the decisions taken by the Tunisian President, Kais Saied, in his coup against the constitution, and his disruption of democratic governance mechanisms in order to seize control of the government. The paper ponders the reasons that Tunisians welcome the decisions of the Tunisian president, and asks if that means that they have turned their backs on the young democracy they established ten years ago? Finally, the paper monitors a set of indicators regarding Arab public opinion on governing institutions, and the government's seriousness in working to solve economic and social problems, which escalated in severity during the Covid-19 pandemic.

This paper presents Tunisian public opinion trends towards the country’s democratic experience, using data gathered by the ACRPS-published Arab Opinion Index, comparing the 2019/2020 results with previous polls. It also seeks to measure the popular reaction to the decisions taken by the Tunisian President, Kais Saied, in his coup against the constitution, and his disruption of democratic governance mechanisms in order to seize control of the government. The paper ponders the reasons that Tunisians welcome the decisions of the Tunisian president, and asks if that means that they have turned their backs on the young democracy they established ten years ago? Finally, the paper monitors a set of indicators regarding Arab public opinion on governing institutions, and the government's seriousness in working to solve economic and social problems, which escalated in severity during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.

This section monitors the most prominent political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish a collection of documents from Tunisia, and Egypt, covering the period from May 1 to June 30, 2023.