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Interest Iranian foreign policy in Africa could be treat back to the sixties of the last twentieth century, when African states attained their independence.

This report chronicles some of the most significant developments relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The election of a president in Lebanon is an important event not because of the person or their powers—since indeed the role lost its power after the Taif Agreement—

Oil is not just related to economics but is also connected to political development. This paper looks at the effect of oil on democracy by relying on a theoretical and empirical study using the tools of descriptive statistics, regression analysis, and statistical tests in the light of political economy in the form of the “resource curse.” It studies how authoritarian regimes have used hydrocarbon resources to prevent democratization by means of a range of mechanisms such as the tax impact, group formation, the effect of spending, and repression. The statistical analysis reveals that there is a statistically-significant inverse relationship between democracy and oil production. It can be said therefore that the oil states are less likely to become democratic. Although most Third-World states have been afflicted by the resource curse, it is not possible to view it as inevitable, but rather the result of dependence on the track represented by the inability to diversify resources or weakness in doing so. The resource curse does not apply to all states rich in natural resources, such as Norway.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

This discussion aims to refocus attention on those historical facts—both known and overlooked—and to highlight the enduring power of words and terminology, coinciding with the resistance of the people of the Holy Land against the Zionists in Palestine.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

​Through literature reviews (mainly in English and German), this review sheds light on the analytical approaches prevalent in the study of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and their outcomes before and after the Arab revolutions, and explores previous and current theoretical reflections on them. Using all of this, the study attempts to contribute to a better understanding of the various issues in the region. The first part presents the various analytical concepts and their results before the revolutions, and the second part provides an overview of the analyzes of the Arab revolutions. The third part reviews the theoretical reflections on the previous analytical approaches. Finally, the researcher makes some concluding observations.

ISIL is the legitimate child of the crisis of the political regime that developed in Iraq after 2003. The eight-year rule of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki instituted a monopoly