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ﺗﺸﻬﺪ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ ﻣﻨﺬ أواﺧﺮ أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017 أزﻣﺔ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻫﻲ ا ﻛﺜﺮ ﺣﺪةً ﻣﻨﺬ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ ﻋﺎم 1981. ﺑﺪأت ا زﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﻤﻠﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴّﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻗﺎدﺗﻬﺎ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ إﻋﻼم ﺳﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وإﻣﺎراﺗﻴﺔ. وﺑﺨﻼف أزﻣﺔ ﺳﺤﺐ اﻟﺴﻔﺮاء ﻋﺎم 2014، أﻗﺪﻣﺖ ﺛﻼث دول ﺧﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، واﻣﺎرات ﻣﻊ ﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 2017، ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﻓﺮض ﺣﺼﺎر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺮ ﺛﻢ ﺳﻠ ﻤﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻣﻄﺎﻟﺐ، وأﻣﻬﻠﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻳﺎم ﻟﺘﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ أو ﻣﻮاﺟﻬﺔ ﺳﻴﻨﺎرﻳﻮﻫﺎت ﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪﻳﺔ. وﻓﻲ اﻃﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ، ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪول إﻟﻰ ﻋﺰل ﻗﻄﺮ دﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴًﺎ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ ﺟﺒﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﻀﻮع، ﻏﻴﺮ أنّ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻜﺒﺮى ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﺖ ﺑﻤﺴﺆوﻟﻴﺔ أﻛﺒﺮ ﺗﺠﺎه ازﻣﺔ، وﺑﺪأت ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﺪور اﻟﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﻟﺘﺴﻮﻳﺘﻬﺎ. ﺗﺴﻠﻂ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﺬور ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ وﻣﺴﺎراﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺮﺟﺔ ﺑﺤﻜﻢ ﺗﺪاﺧﻞ أدوار ﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﻦ اﻗﻠﻴﻤﻴﻦ واﻟﺪوﻟﻴﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﺣﺼﺎر ﻗﻄﺮ، ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻲ. Since late May 2017, the Gulf region has been witness to the most intense diplomatic crisis since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Tis paper attempts to highlight the roots of the present-day Gulf crisis and explore the potential, complicated outcomes, taking in the roles of various regional and global players. Te crisis begun with a vicious smear campaign against Qatar and led by Saudi- and Emirati-state owned media. In contrast to the 2014 diplomatic rif in which the Ambassadors of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were withdrawn from Doha, this latest crisis also included a complete severing of diplomatic ties on the part of the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in addition to Egypt.To this was later added a complete blockade of Qatar by air, sea and land. Te countries leading the siege on Doha later presented a ten-point ultimatum to Qatar to fulfill within 10 days. A further attempt by the countries leading the blockade to isolate Qatar on the world stage failed, however, as leading world powers opted to play a more constructive role and mediate an end to the crisis.

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This book examines the political, economic, historical, cultural, and linguistic relations between GCC countries and the Horn of Africa, highlighting the region's strategic significance to the Gulf.

Examining the negative effects on the economies of oil-exporting Arab countries as a result of the current imbalance in the international monetary system, this paper finds that the imbalance is mainly represented in the continuation of the dollar as the central reserve currency of the Gulf States. As long as this imbalance exists, it postulates, the surpluses achieved by these countries in their balance of foreign payments ends up as dollar-denominated reserves deposited in the US government treasury or as US bonds. In other words, as loans countries with financial surpluses Gulf States give to the richest economy in the world in return for meager interest rates instead of investing them in high-yielding productive projects that could increase demand in the global economy, drive up employment rates, and help protect against crises and instability. This study aims to start a debate about the need for the Gulf countries to take part in efforts to reform the international monetary system, and join developing nations that spend on infrastructure and sustainable development instead of on defense. This paper sees such a move as ensuring that the Gulf States would then participate in reforming global governance and the development of the international monetary system. Gulf countries should seriously consider joining the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Bank, as well as establish a trans-regional bank between Asian and Arab countries, as a more advanced step.

US and Gulf relations are based on more than self-interest, but common selfinterest is always a key (or the key) factor in shaping an alliance and strategic relationship. The key common self-interests that drives US and Arab Gulf relations are security – the need to deal with Iran, fighting extremism, and securing the flow of petroleum exports out of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula to meet the needs of the global economy, and to provide the key source of income for the Gulf states. This study explains why the United States maintains close ties with its Arab strategic partners in the Gulf. The study finds out that the US and its Gulf strategic partners face serious challenges, including domestic political change in the US, divisions between Arab states, the impact of regional conflicts and instability, and the growing role of non-Western powers.

The study examines wealth and power in the US energy policy in the Gulf region using the international political economy approach, which proposes a relationship of mutual influence between the market and foreign policy. The study is based on two main analytical approaches: economic liberalism and economic realism. By tracking the course of US energy policy in the Gulf, the study extrapolates factors determining US energy security interests between twofold economic and political objectives; creating wealth and maximizing power. It also looks at the weighting factors of one at the expense of the other or the extent to which they are merged. It also aims to assess the future of the US approach to the region given Washington's energy independence strategy. The study argues that the critical impact of energy, especially oil, on economic development and the well-being of nations cannot be ignored.