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One of the most important gains of Tunisia’s revolution has been that elections are no longer subject to interior ministry supervision. A look at these elections reveals a process managed by a permanent constitutional body, the Independent High Authority for Elections, which in itself marks a revolutionary success. These events are read within the context of the assassination of Constituent Assembly member Mohamed Brahmi, which caused many to worry that the democratic path would be hindered, as in other Arab Spring countries. More than the elections mechanism, this paper argues that success can also be attributed to the Troika alliance, especially the Ennahda party. It shows how the neutrality of the military institution and the great role played by the country’s General Labor Union in bridging the gap between Tunisian opponents through national dialogue, have largely contributed in the success of the elections.

This paper investigates the factors that have led to the collapse of Baath-ruled Syria. It argues that the abandonment of the rentier – distributive economic system that had traditionally propped up the social base of the Baath party (labourers, farmers, and rural populations) and the adoption of liberal economic policies was key to the crisis. The end of the Cold War, the passing of resistance discourse, with the start of the Middle East peace process, and the information revolution have contributed to weakening the cultural and ideological hegemony of the Syrian Baath-ruled state. This led to increasing reliance on the security apparatus to control an increasingly young and educated society. The loosening economic grip of the state resulting from the abandonment of the public sector, and the rise of crony capitalism accompanied by the declining role of political socialisation (in schools and universities), and the loss of control over the flow of information, left the regime with no other option but resorting to violence to deal with the crisis. The peaceful opposition movement hitherto was transformed into an armed revolution, and then into a regional and international proxy war, with the rising role foreign interference in the crisis.

Cyber-attacks are considered a new battlefield to be added to the list of conventional threats facing the world. This paper analyzes this growing phenomenon of internet cyber-attacks and sheds more light on the virtual world. The dimensions and effects of this threat transcend political and geographic borders, and its repercussions jeopardize states’ national security and biosecurity. The study exposes issues and consequences of hacking and cracking operations initiated by internet pirates or hackers and “anonymous” groups. The study also touches on the reach of this virtual world that has overcome distances and that should be taken as a guiding light to better address the new threats of this phenomenon on real life.

This study examines the impact of post-truth discourse during the 2019 Sudanese Revolution and the subsequent transitional period, as well as the role played by social media platforms in promoting this discourse and mobilizing broad segments of the population behind it. The study also explores the susceptibility of social media users to follow false news in contrast to their engagement with factual reporting. It argues that the Sudanese Revolution and the transitional phase (2019 – 2023) coincided with the emergence of a new media landscape rooted in a politically and socially divided environment, characterized by diverse perspectives and the growing influence of social media. These platforms played positive roles in the dynamics of the revolution, significantly contributing to the mobilization of large popular groups to participate in demonstrations and sit-ins that ultimately led to the regime's overthrow. However, they also generated confusion and uncertainty among these groups due to the rise of post-truth discourse fueled by fake news, which in turn intensified polarization among revolutionary youth and activists.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

Forty days after the outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution, on March 21, 2011, General Ali Mohsen Saleh al-Ahmar (commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armoured Division), Major General Mohammad Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (commander of the eastern military district) and a number of commanders of other military units declared their support for the revolution. The Yemeni army divided into two: “supporters of the revolution army” and the “family army,” according to the characterization by the forces of the revolution. This development exposed to the public the hidden divisions within the structure of the Yemeni Army, taking it to the point of no return. The capital Sanaa and some other Yemeni cities witnessed limited armed confrontations between the two armies and between the militias supported by them. That is why the executive mechanism of The Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative (the Gulf Initiative) included a special term for uniting the army, restructuring it, and ending its division. With the split as its background and the Gulf Initiative as its point of departure, this paper aims to show what was achieved in terms of restructuring the army. It describes the course of this restructuring operation, the difficulties it entailed, the tasks that have not yet been accomplished, as well as its impact on national unity, social integration, and confidence-building between the parties participating in the national dialogue conference.

​According to Jonathan Grix and Fiona Carmichael, when implementing national sport policies, one of the governments' main objectives is to invest funds into gaining international prestige. Although these national sport policies' objectives have also been identified by several other leading scholars in sport governance, research proposing a measurement of these policies' success or failure remains scarce. In fact, to evaluate if countries have reached international prestige through sports, researchers tend to generally refer to the Olympic Medal Table, while the newly created soft power indicators, the "Soft Power 30", "Soft Power Index" and "Global Soft Power Index" have not managed to use appropriate sport rankings to measure countries' capacities to use sport as an instrument of soft power. The objective of this paper is to identify the inaccuracies of these commonly used indices and propose a new ranking that would evaluate whether the national sport policies implemented by governments have succeeded in developing soft power.

Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?