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By analysing qualitative and archival primary sources, this paper examines intra-military relations in Syria during the period in which Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (1961 - 1963). It explores the consequences of the failure to apply what can be described as "Concordance Theory", particularly regarding the impact of military divisions on civil-military relations, and how these divisions led to dangerous fragmentation within the military institution itself. Additionally, it examines the role these divisions played in the disintegration of the political system during the secession, without neglecting the social and political conditions that influenced these developments. The paper highlights the emergence of the Damascene 'Shwam' officers' faction as a result of policies aimed at containing and dismantling military factions during the unity period, and how this faction managed to lead the secession coup. It also analyses how this elite failed to maintain control over the army and government institutions, with their efforts to assert control giving rise to competing coup factions, ultimately leading to the collapse of military leadership and the loss of command and control. This paved the way for the military coup on 8 March 1963.

This study seeks to provide a preliminary diagnosis potential and opportunitiesand the obstacles which impede the reform of the military sector in the Arab world through the analysis of the most important trends and indicators positively or negatively regarding to the rationalization of the military institution in the Arab world, taking in consideration many experiences and the best practices prevailing in many democratic countries.This study attempts to answer these questions: What positive measures have been taken for the army to become controlled and under the responsibility of civil institutions? What is the degree of openness of the military institution and its interaction with the citizens, the media and civil society? How and why the enhancement of transparency within the army will contribute to the promotion of democratic transformation in the Arab countries?

This study addresses a longstanding and renewed subject in the case of Sudan: the continual interference of military formations and elites in political authority and the instability of post-independence civil governance. It uses a compound methodology blending a historical reading of political events and developments with a descriptive reading of the present reality, in its domestic and foreign dimensions, and a forecast of Sudan's future in light of the current situation. The study observes that the plurality of regional, ethnic, and military structures, instead of being a constructive and integrating aspect of the Sudanese state and nation, has reflected negatively on the country's unity and its political and security stability. Since independence, these formations have remained in confrontation, whether between one another or among the internal parts and divisions of each. Evidence for this claim is found in Sudan's complex crises, including that of governance, the South, Darfur, the current transitional period, and the struggle for power presently raging between military branches.

The contemporary Yemeni state is characterized by strife and complications involving all aspects of the state and society. These complexities go back to the era of its inception and continue today, leaving serious implications for the political, geographic and social unity of Yemen. There are very clear intersections between the internal (political, economic, social) and external components, which contribute to the sustained crisis in the Yemeni state. Successive Yemeni governments have failed to fulfill their assumed duties and functions, thus preventing them from dealing with all kinds of foreign interventions. Moreover, tribal and sectarian roles in Yemen have historically prevailed over other Yemeni political roles, which have not succeeded in transferring Yemen to civil rule. Nor have they managed to build a democratic model that achieves stability and allows Yemenis to participate actively in the political and economic process, consolidate the concepts of citizenship and the rule of law, and safeguard the various rights and freedoms of all members of Yemeni society.

The debate over the most appropriate model for governing Somalia continues. This article begins by synthetizing that debate using interviews, discussion groups, as well as document and literature analyses. It addresses issues of complaint with the current system, including lack of confidence, demands for democracy, access to basic services, and for a fair share of resources. These form the core of local interest in decentralized proposals. It analyses the regional and international context, as well as tribal politics as forces pushing for the current tribal federal project. The suitability of proposals for confederacy, federalism, government by consensus, and decentralization contained in the published literature are analyzed in this context, alongside the literature available on the subject. The paper finds that a decentralized system is the most appropriate governance model for Somalia, explaining how the flexible tools it involves will work to keep the country united, address local grievances, and legitimate interests of external Parties.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

This study reassesses the experience of political openness in Algeria within the analytical and explanatory categories of political economy. It is built on the premise that the transition from a totalitarian authoritarian regime to a democratic one presupposes the transition from a rentier economy linked to the external market and dominated by rentier groups, to a productive economy based on the national bourgeoisie exploitation of local labour to create wealth. The study argues that the experience of democratic transition in Algeria faltered due to the failure of the rentier groups to undergo capitalist transformation that could have allowed the emergence of the two main sides of the democratic equation: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The political elites that control the rentier economy were willing to accept political but not economic reforms that could have led to a reconsideration of the hegemonic relations within society and liberated it from the grip of power. In this regard, the failure of the economic reforms introduced by the Hamrouche government (1989 - 1991) was a prelude to the disruption of the democratic transition and prevention of the development of a civil society capable of gaining its independence from authority and, on the other hand, the independence of the Algerian state from the global market.

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

This paper offers insights into the Crisis of Liberal International Order by combining Ibn Khaldun's theory of change with scholarship on liberalism and race. We argue that the crisis emerges from the incongruence of two features of liberal order: a binding feature (or 'assabiyya) of white supremacy and liberalism's principles of equality. The crisis is an outcome of a normative political order that can no longer balance a material and discursive reality of racialised hierarchy with ideals of equality. The crisis cannot be reduced to bad leadership or a technical failure to enact liberal values. Instead, attempts to think beyond the crisis must acknowledge the incongruence between white supremacy and liberal equality. Through this diagnosis, we gesture towards the constructive use of "non-Western" theory in the discipline of International Relations.

This study problematises the theoretical dialectic between the rule of law as a formal legal principle, and democracy as a political value. Taking a fundamental legal approach, the paper builds a concept of a constitutionalization democratic rule of law, through which it is possible to overcome the constant tension in democracy between the authority of the majority in deciding the law, and individual rights and freedoms. It concludes that the rule of law does not mean the rule of law over individual rights, and democracy does not mean the rule of the majority only, but that respect for individual rights and granting them a constitutional value are a prerequisite for constitutionalizing the principle of a democratic rule of law. However, the application of this principle, in practice, will be linked to the role of the constitutional judge in reconciling, through constitutional oversight, the power of the majority, which is embodied in the principle of the rule of law, and constitutional rights, which are the essence of the democratic principle.