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This paper analyses of some of the most salient Israeli laws and legal instruments used to entrench control over Jerusalem and alter the city spatially and demographically. The first of three sections examines the Israeli legal instruments used, since the 1948 occupation of western districts of the city, to control Jerusalem. The second section explores the repercussions of US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017. The same section also examines the enshrinement of "Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel" law of 1980, amendments to which require an overwhelming majority of Knesset members. The third and final section explores the avenues potentially available to the Palestinians in confronting Israeli plans for the re-settling of Jerusalem, a task which requires the formulation of a clear, multi-faceted strategy implemented by both grassroots and official Palestinians.

Although women have been present in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood since its inception, their status in the organization and political role has been restricted by Brotherhood thinking that promotes a division of roles in society on the basis of biological difference, and that emphasizes the primary role for women being in the private sphere and their central function being in the family. During the short period of democratic opening up that followed the January 25 revolution, the political participation of Brotherhood women increased. Following the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, women went beyond the frameworks and roles assigned to them. They took to the streets and for the first time in the history of the Brotherhood were at the forefront of the movement of protest and opposition against the political regime. In spite of these visible developments, this paper holds that these shifts derived from the absence of Brotherhood men, and does not reflect a shift in the ideology. For these development to have an impact on the power relations between men and women in the movement, and to lead to the political and organizational empowerment of women, there should be a fundamental change in the movement’s vision of women in general.

The 2011 Arab uprisings sparked hopes for positive change in the regional politics of the Middle East. The uprisings not only challenged the authority of states at the domestic level but seemed poised to disrupt regional geopolitics and alter the position of the Middle East in the international system. With the outbreak of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the unprecedented proliferation of armed non- state actors in the region, the uprisings seem to drive important changes in the nature of the state and its regional and international role. Despite its artificial inception and its puzzling survival throughout the 20 th century, the Arab State faces challenges in the post- 2011 era and its vulnerabilities have been exposed. While the uprisings may have weakened Arab states, changes at regional and international levels created permissive conditions to challenge the regional state system. Hamas's 7 October 2023 operation and Israel's ensuing wars in the region have further exacerbated state erosion and reinvigorated post- 2011 regional dynamics. This paper examines how structural international and regional conditions have reshaped statehood and agency in the region post- 2011. It also explores how the responses of Arab states to international conditions and the regional reverberations of the uprisings have further generated disintegrative effects for the Arab state.

The Moroccan February 20 protest movement came with the mobilization of the Moroccan street through peaceful demonstrations demanding constitutional reforms in the framework of a parliamentary monarchy. The king, keen not to replicate what happened in neighboring states, could not ignore the February 20 movement. This pushed him to announce the program for constitutional reform in his speech on March 9, 2011. The strategy of the political regime to contain and defuse the February 20 movement led every initiative, including the project for the 2011 constitution, to become a resource and weapon in the hands of the authorities, and means for the symbolic and material suppression of the February 20 movement. The constitutional referendum of July 1, 2012, which was backed by the people, and which February 20 called to boycott, represented the beginning of the rapid demise of the movement, because it reinforced the legitimacy of reform, and hence the monarchy. The February 20 Movement represents an opportunity to rethink the meaning of opposition in Morocco, particularly when set against analysis formulated in the 1970s by pioneers such as John Waterbury and Rémy Leveau, who concluded that the opposition, despite its differences and variety of protests, served in the end to reproduce the existing political regime.

This paper examines those Arab Spring states in which political Islamists are actively engaged. Specifically, it looks at the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, in which political Islamists were involved in regime change, as well as Morocco and Jordan, which did not experience regime change but in which Islamists were actively engaged in the political process and a protest movement. Following an examination of the individual circumstances which prevail in each of these states, the author asserts that there remains a number of pressing questions related to the future roles of political Islamists that merit attention. The first question surrounds the political and ideological project that the Islamists want to promote: will Islamists be capable of shedding their ideological burden, and forwarding a novel political program? This paper demonstrates the limitations of the long-standing ideological promulgations of the Islamists, especially as it pertains to questions of the nation-state, democracy, pluralism, civil liberties and minority rights.

The presence of the external factor is usually related to the context of the popular hirak, the periods of political transition and the transitional phases in many countries. This factor is evident in countries with a geopolitical position in regional and international competition. This study discusses the variable of the external factor in the 22 February 2019 hirak in Algeria by examining the limits of international and regional interventions in steering the course of the popular hirak compared to other Arab cases where the external factor seemed to be more influential. It aims to discuss the determinants of Algeria's relations with regional and international powers and to explain the issue of the lack of external interference in the popular hirak, ending with the modalities of the future of the turbulent political path and discussing the possibilities of transformation from abroad. The study concludes that the lack of regional and international intervention in the popular hirak is mainly related to geopolitical and strategic constraints, far from value and normative considerations. The behaviour of external forces is determined by Algeria's geopolitical situation. The risks of instability in the country would create highly complex security challenges in the Mediterranean region. Added to this is the importance of Algeria in assessing the strategic balances in the region, especially for European security.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.

This study discusses the possibility of bridging the gap between IR (International Relation) and Foreign Policy Analysis when studying the interaction between memory and apology in foreign policy. By dealing with apology as an expressive practice, not just as a tact between statesmen, this study argues that apology is an act used by states to express their attitudes toward their past memories. It presumes that examining the interaction on the theoretical level between concepts such as narrative identity, ontological security, and discursive representations would bridge the gap between the two fields through two versions of social constructivism. Those two versions are then used to understand the motives behind Germany's apology to Israel, and Turkey's resistance to apologize to Armenia despite international pressure to do so. The study concludes that "critical constructivism" approach by Nizar Messari can explain the German case. It considers the role of foreign policy as a tool in reconstructing national identity through transforming representation of the Jewish/Israeli "other" from a "different other", who is an enemy of the self, to a "similar other", who is a part of its moral responsibility. As for Turkey, it concludes that Ted Hopf's "practical/societal constructivism" suggests that the reasons behind Turkey's unwillingness to apologize to Armenia is due to an ontological need best understood as "a need to preserve the routine of its narrative identity, and the need to preserve it heroic memories".

From an economic standpoint, this study aims to comprehend the reasons for the popular uprising outbreak, as well as the chances for democratic transition from a political economy angle. It examines the influence of the rentier state economic growth regime on the political prospects of citizens, particularly young people, who are convinced that such a regime will not lead to their ultimate safety, but rather to their economic marginalization due to the system's poor performance. It turns out that adopting a more comprehensive and long-term growth approach has become even more critical. As time goes by, it became evident that reform comes at a hefty cost on all fronts. Rather than being a tributary and assistance to the continuance of economic reforms, political reforms became an impediment and took on even greater importance than economic reform itself. The Algerian situation, according to the study, is an example of the intractable model of democratic transition in all its manifestations, since the incumbent system was pleased with restricted constitutional arrangements, notably elections. This has strengthened the rentier state in all its forms, including the political system's fragility and the succession of crises it has faced since independence till today.

This study discusses several hypotheses proposed by political culture literature, especially those that adopt a structural approach to understanding the relationship of social structures and institutions to actors, and the values generated by the nature of this relationship that inspire political action. The paper posits that research into the pattern of political culture arising from the relationship between social structures and actors is not limited to studying this direct relationship, but rather requires an examination of intermediary factors. Hence, the study outlines a supportive conceptual interpretive framework, through Pierre Bourdieu's Social Theory. It begins by reviewing the concepts discussed by Bourdieu to explain the relationship between social structures and actors. The second section presents a comparative analysis of concepts taken from political culture and those of Bourdieu that explain the emergence of political culture through the reciprocal relationship between social structures and actors. The third examines the outcomes of this comparison in light of the 2007 Palestinian political division.