Latest Articles

​This paper will present a study of the challenges posed by the Tunisian transitional phase since the country's successful popular revolution; specifically, it will examine the problem from the perspective of the Tunisian General Labor Union. Any appropriate discussion of the Tunisian post-revolutionary transitional phase would call for an understanding of the theory of transitional phases, the author has chosen to focus primarily on the conceptual framework of civil society. He did this, however, only after highlighting some of the theoretical limitations of the concept of a civil society. With this in mind, Tunisia's General Labor Union remains one of the most significant pillars of Tunisian civil society. For the purposes of this paper, "civil society" is defined as those social forces which defend the ideals of justice and dignity and which fight to undo the subcultures and structures which have hindered political freedoms in Tunisia.

Book Title: Syria’s Via Dolorosa to Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History [Arabic]

Milestones in Democratic Transition in the Arab World, 1/1-28/2/2023.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This study sheds light on European-Russian relations in the energy field, a complex relationship where the political, economic, and social interact. Russia, today, is a key partner in European security issues, and it is impossible to talk about European security without addressing the Russian role and its effect on the European security system. Russia is also the largest exporter of energy to Europe and its main trading partner. The EU, conversely, is the largest consumer of Russian energy exports, and the EU states have important trade relations with Russia. All this makes European-Russian relations in the energy sphere subject to tension between pressure for cooperation and conflict over interests in the balances of power in the international order.

​This study fits into a broad category of scholarship concerned with transitional periods in various political systems. Specifically, it examines the political transition in post-revolutionary Tunisia since 2011. It does so by comparing the legal provisions of the post-revolutionary transition - the major texts, which define the transitional stage - and the political realities, which take the shape of events, actions and political discourse. A point of particular focus is the 2011 elections to the National Constituent Assembly, which the author analyzes through the rubric of "electoral engineering". One more conclusion of the paper is that electoral engineering remains a feature of Tunisian politics, although it has gone from "authoritarian electoral engineering" to "democratic electoral engineering," reflecting changes which have taken in the country as a whole.

Current Russian policy is based on a nationalism that rests on state capitalism, and that speaks to nationalist sentiment built on the rejection of Western exploitation. This patriotic nationalist position becomes evident through the lack of any ideologically derived principles driving Russia’s position: state interests including national security are what drive current policy. The drivers for this new Russian policy mean that Russia can simultaneously suppress a separatist movement by armed force in one region and champion another separatist movement with armed force in another. In this sense, the Russian Federation has no fixed positions but only fixed interests, and even its interests can change. In Syria, critics suggest that the proximate aim of Russia’s policy is to defend the Assad regime, Moscow’s ally, from collapse. Saving the regime is not, however, an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of self-assertion and another step toward the goal of becoming a global superpower, this time in the Middle East. If the Syrian regime believes its rescue is the exclusive objective of Russia’s intervention, it is wrong. The exertion of Russian influence will at most provide a temporary respite. The mere fact of Russia’s military presence in Syria means that the regime is no longer master of its own destiny and no longer even a player on the international stage, since Russia is now its proxy at any international negotiations.

​This study explores the concept of a traditional balance of power based on realism, which, for several reasons, is unsuitable to explain the relations between the US and the Gulf States. First, competition between the main regional powers, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, is not characterized of direct confrontation, but rather manifests through proxy interference in civil war-torn countries (Syria, Yemen, and Iraq). Second, since the greatest threat to the region that has resulted from this competition is an unintended escalation, the final endgame must be collective security and stability, not a balance of power. Third, balance of power in the conventional sense is unrealistic given the actual quantitative and qualitative conventional military superiority of the GCC countries compared to Iran's military capacity.

Despite the great pains made over the years since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership passed the European Neighborhood Policy to support programs for democratic reform in the phase following the Arab uprisings. The EU's conditional policies to support democratic transformations in the Southern Mediterranean Countries have revealed many structural imbalances. These countries did not gain the desired political and democratic momentum that the Eastern European countries. There was also a growing trend towards European Countries prioritizing security considerations at the expense of supporting democracy, especially after the increased security cooperation to combat terrorist threats and irregular migration. These uprisings thus formed an experiment and a real challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of the EU's conditional democratic policies. To what extent have the European policies associated with democratic conditionality succeeded in supporting the dynamics and interactions of the Arab uprisings? Does maintaining security and stability and combating terrorism void European democratic conditionality at its hard core?

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.