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Following the transformations in the Levant’s regional system since the beginning of World War II to the rise of the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, this paper examines the new context of the region with regard to Washington’s resumption of direct military intervention. It finds that the Levant – as a soft area easily subject to geopolitical influences – has always been subject to changes based on shifts in world order, from the Cold War, followed by unipolarity, to the relative decline of US power. Thus, while the main actors of the Levant’s regional system were Arabs during the Cold War, the region has become a battleground for non-Arab parties – namely Turkey and Iran – following the invasion or Iraq and the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions.

Consociationalism is a system of government recommended for ‘divided societies’. Starting with a discussion of its theoretical components and criticisms it has received, this article addresses how consociationalism has been implemented in in post - 2003 Iraq. The article asks whether the Iraqi constitution and institutions formed by it represented a successful case of consociationalism. Key consociational mechanisms such as an electoral system based on proportional representation, governments based on big multi - party coalitions and a federal and decentralized governance were adopted. However, this model was not entirely consociational as some practices that are common in the majoritarian government have also been used. In fact, divisions between majoritarian and consociational perspectives have polarized, and sometimes paralyzed, the political process. In light of this, the article discusses the sustainability of the current model and its likely future trajectories.

​This paper addresses a theoretical model for the concept of "consociational democracy", beginning with the concept's roots in the Austrian Marxist tradition before describing its elaboration in 1969 by the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart. Lijphart's work was part of his wider critique of Gabriel Almond's categorization of Western political systems. This study presents a structural criticism of the term "consociational democracy" and its usage, arguing that the practice of "consociational democracy" was born of pragmatic policies before maturing into a theoretical model. It argues that the subsequent contributions of Lijphart were merely an extrapolation from a set of examples without "theory" to underpin it and that "power sharing" does not necessarily lead to democratization. The study thus draws up several theoretical observations that help distinguish "consociationalism" from "consociational democracy". Finally, the paper contrasts the suitability of this theoretical model for both Northern Ireland and Lebanon.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

​Events in Mosul, which was captured by ISIL on June 9, 2014, cannot be viewed in isolation from the severe political crisis afflicting the post 2003 Iraqi political regime. Generally speaking, radical groups cannot be separated from the political environment that fostered them. They are the product of a structurally imbalanced political situation. The growth of such groups in Iraq, from Al Qaeda to ISIL, provides a textbook lesson of this. They are the expression of an imbalance political situation, even if they develop and assume an independence from the political context that gave birth to them. They grow, develop, and draw oxygen from these imbalances and from sharp political and social divisions. Hence, it is not possible to defend the idea that these groups have autonomous power, rather their power derives from the acceptance of their social incubator in a political context that this incubator allows to play a role in correcting the balances of power, as a tool or revenge, pressure, influence, or the like.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.

This article examines how the Hirak illustrates a renewal of nation-building and civic practices in contemporary Algeria. To do so, it takes a look at the use of history and identity during the mobilization of 2019 and 2020. The Hirak has produced a joint social and political distinction process through the exchanges of discourses and representations about Algeria's history in a moment of contentious politics; doing so, the Hirak has used portraits of former political figures and historical events to propose an alternate view of Algeria's history, now appropriated by the people. Concerning identity, the widespread use of the Berber flag and solidarity practices throughout the national territory, following its informal ban, shows the emergence of a pluralist conception of the Algerian society. The paper concludes that Algerians are on the way to establish a polity beyond primordialism and patron-client's relationships, and that a modern citizens' nationhood is on the brink of emergence.

In an effort to understand the characteristics of "virtual communities" and specifically "information societies," this study attempts to test the argument that virtual communities, with their networked structure, pose a challenge (or represent an alternative) to traditional hierarchical structures, due to the former's ability to self-organize, and settle their internal disputes without the need for authoritative intervention. The study uses the case study approach, applied to 3 Wikipedia's edit wars. The chosen cases are related to a number of Middle East informational crises. The study concludes that mechanisms of virtual societies (e.g. self-organization) can work efficiently in cases of limited disputes, but in cases of sharp disagreements, traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms that include authoritative intervention and exercising some form of power, in a "top-down" approach, remain essential for conflict resolution. This implies that the factor of "authority" remains significant even in the context of virtual communities.

In association with the Issam Fares Institute at the American University of Beirut, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a three-day conference (January 21-23, 2016) to study the developments associated with the Arab Spring in the intervening five years.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.