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The Gulf Crises and Blockade of Qatar: Economic, Legal and Political Perspective

ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺶ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ "اﻟﺰام" ﺑﻤﻘﺮرات اﻟﻌﻤﻞ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮك ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺼﻌﻴﺪ ا ﻣﻨﻲ، زاﻋﻤﺔ أن اﻃﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﻟﻤﻜﺎﻓﺤﺔ ارﻫﺎب ﻣﺎ زاﻟﺖ ﻫﻲ اﺟﺪر وا ﻗﺪر ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺠﺎوز اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع اﻟﺬي ﺿﺮب اﻟﺴﺎﺣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻣﺆﺧﺮًا وأﻓﻀﻰ إﻟﻰ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﺾ ﻗﻄﺮ ﻟﺤﺼﺎر دول ﻋﺮﺑﻴﺔ أرﺑﻊ، ﻗﻔﺰت ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻃﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، وﻃﺮﺣﺖ اﺳﺘﺒﺪاﻟﻪ ﺑﺄﻃﺮ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة، أو اﺳﺘﺪﻋﺎء أﺳﺎﻧﻴﺪ ﻣﻠﻔﻘﺔ ﻛﻞ ﻏﺎﻳﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺢ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوﻋﻴﺔ ﺟﺮاءات اﻟﺤﺼﺎر. وﺗﺤﺎﺟﺞ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺑﺄن اﻃﺮ اﻟﺠﺰﺋﻴﺔ اﻟﺜﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ واﻟﺮﺑﺎﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ اﺳﺘﺤﺪﺛﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻴﺎق ازﻣﺔ، ﺳﻮاء اﺿﻄﺮارًا ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ، ﺑﺘﻮﻗﻴﻌﻬﺎ ﻣﺬﻛﺮة ﺗﻔﺎﻫﻢ ﺛﻨﺎﺋﻴﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺠﺎﻧﺐ اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ ﺣﻮل ﺗﻤﻮﻳﻞ ارﻫﺎب؛ أو اﻧﺘﻬﺎزًا ﻟﻔﺮص اﻻﺑﺘﺰاز اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻟﻦ ﺗﻐﻨﻲ ﺑﺤﺎل ﻋﻦ اﻃﺮ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺎس إﻟﺰام واﻟﺘﺰام، ﻋﻠﻰ وﻓﻖ ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﺗﺤﺘﺮم ﺳﻴﺎدة اﻟﺪول وﺗﺤﻔﺰﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪ ﺟﺴﻮر اﻟﺘﻌﺎون. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، ﻣﻜﺎﻓﺤﺔ ارﻫﺎب، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﺪول اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ، ﻗﻄﺮ. This paper explores the question of adherence to commitments to joint Arab action, particularly in the security realm. The author contends that Arab cooperative frameworks for the combatting of terrorism remain the most relevant and potent force to overcome intra-Arab rivalries of the type which have most recently led a group of four Arab countries to blockade Qatar. The author further contends that piecemeal or separate bi-lateral frameworks, or even multi-lateral agreements between a number of actors—such as were in evidence during the latest Gulf Crisis—will never be a replacement for collective Arab action on these points. Such collective Arab action must be based on foundations of mutual commitment and respect for the sovereignty of the individual countries, incentivizing them to build channels of cooperation.

The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is the fifth in a series of yearly public opinion surveys across the Arab world. The first survey was conducted in 2011, with following surveys in 2012/2013 and 2014. The 2016 Arab Opinion Index is based on face-to-face interviews conducted with 18,310 individual respondents in 12 separate Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. Sampling followed a randomized, stratified, multi-stage, self-weighted clustered approach, giving an overall margin of error between +/- 2 % and 3% for the individual country samples. The overall samples guarantee probability-proportional-to-size (PPS), ensuring fairness in the representation of various population segments. With an aggregate sample size of 18,310 respondents (50% of whom were men and 50% women). The Arab Opinion Index remains the largest public opinion survey covering the Middle East and North Africa. The fieldwork was carried out by an overall team of 840 individuals (half of whom were women), who conducted 45,000 hours of face-to-face interviews, covering a total of 760,000 kilometers across the population clusters sampled.

​Five years prior, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies brought together a group of young activists whose dedication and courage gave ris eto what would become the Arab Spring. The group of activists, gathered again in Doha on January 15-16, 2016, appeared to have been completely changed by the intervening months. With the initial ecstasy of the fall of tyrants across the region now faded, the young revolutionary activists had matured ideologically and politically. It was a maturity born of suffering and setbacks, and revealed a realism towards the coming battle for freedom. One unchanging fact was their continued hope for freedom, and their belief in its possibility.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.

This paper elucidates Arab public opinion towards the international aerial campaign against ISIL (the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant”) in Iraq and Syria, based on the findings of a dedicated opinion survey. The survey included representative, randomized samples in seven countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, in addition to communities of Syrian refugees in three host countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey). Respondents were asked the extent of their support for the aims of the international campaign as well as the conduct of the airstrikes. Survey questions also take in respondents’ views on a number of related issues. The findings show that the vast majority of Arabs are firmly opposed to ISIL, with only 11% of respondents expressing views which are positive, to varying extents, towards the group.

The Gulf States enjoy a strategic location and economic power, owing that to their oil wealth. The paper examines the contributing factors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states that help in measuring their strength. One of the main goals of the study is to state the points of strength and weakness of these states so that decision-makers in the GCC countries can better understand the contributing factors. The findings show that the points of strength differ from one state to another. It is difficult to accurately evaluate the points of strength that make one state more powerful than the other, but one can deduce that the state's power does not rely on one factor. Based on the study indicators, Qatar emerged the strongest, followed by the UAE then Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain came in sixth place.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

​This article debates the significance of cultural differences in the identification and application of principles of sport governance. It attempts at refuting the underlying assumption that the ‘progress’ achieved and enjoyed within sport governance in the West represents the model to be emulated by the non-west. It argues that modernisation of sport is liable to take on subtly different forms in different local contexts which are modern but not uniform, supporting in effect a form of ‘multiple modernities’. Sport governance, like modernity itself, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, as its (cultural, political, and/or economic, and thus sport) forms varies as much as cultural contexts do, and their characteristics overlap rather than tend to take a unitary set of features attributable to a single model.