Latest Articles

​This paper proposes an approach to studying the impact of the Internet on political culture through the concept of collective memory. Departing from the traditional approaches that confine political culture to knowledge, orientations, and behavior, to constructive and interpretive frameworks that define it through the process of "meaning-making," collective memory emerges as an essential component of political culture with its meanings, symbols, and narratives about political life. The paper concludes – from examining the case of the Egyptian Revolution of January 25, 2011 – that the development of the Internet may limit the role of the state and the elite in shaping political culture and collective memory, but it may also increase the severity of political and social polarization and weaken the culture of tolerance towards the other, and the chances of achieving social reconciliation, which is what we call the "paradox of collective memory".

Following the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani last August, Iranian-American relations now appear set for a major breakthrough, overturning more than three decades of enmity between the two sides. Such a breakthrough, should it come to pass, has the potential to completely transform the bilateral relations over a number of issues, including most importantly the Iranian nuclear program, Iran’s regional role and its involvement in the Middle East’s “hot button” issues, including in the Gulf. The eventual success of efforts to bring Iran and the United States closer together, however, relies also on the roles played by regional players, particularly Israel. This paper explores the reasons behind Israeli anxiety surrounding a potential breakthrough in Iranian-American relations, and Tel Aviv’s ability to influence the outcome of a possible agreement over Iran’s nuclear program and whether such an agreement shall extend to Iran’s regional influence.

​The Iranian nuclear agreement with the P5+1 countries raised speculations and questions that perhaps outnumber and outweigh those that accompanied the public and secret negotiations in the past phase. This is because Iran’s nuclear situation has become even more complex and ambiguous in terms of Iran’s relations with the Western states as well as with its neighbors in the Arab world, specifically the Gulf. The agreement carries regional and international significance on the political and economic levels, among others. This paper discusses the agreement and explores its various consequences on Iran, the region and the world.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.