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​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.

This paper argues that hybrid regimes help to create an environment that encourages the transformation of political disputes into identity conflicts. In such regimes, there is no resolution to the advantage of a particular party, since there is neither full authoritarianism that prevents the existence of any form of competition, rivalry, or conflict, or full democracy that permits the existence of democratic competition according to principles of pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and legal guarantees. In the environment of these hybrid regimes there are some features of democracy and many features of authoritarianism, and so political competition usually begins as a dispute over points of view and intellectual assumptions and ends up as an identity conflict leading to the dissociation of society.

This article examines a contingent Paradigmatic shifts at the 'ESS 2003 and 'EUGSS 2016'. It mainly argued that, the EUGS's including of 'Resilience' as a strategic priority of EU external and security action settled more security roles to the EU. To address these shifts, the article provide three sections. Firstly, we trace with the help of CST the 'genalogy of resilience', and show how resilience as a rationality of governance endorse an intensified logic of security. latter, we explore the EU's two paradigms, 'Normative' and 'Resilience', their meanings, connotations and applications in the EES 2003 and the EEGSS 2016, and show how the EU display a new institutional mechanisms and security/ defense initiatives in order to fulfill its new paradigm. Thirdly, we, test the limits of these shifts by examining the applications of resilience within the European agenda on Migration.

This article looks at Algeria's security policy in general and its security doctrine in particular, analysing its changes and dilemmas in a turbulent regional environment and in the context of an internal Hirak. It argues that these doctrines have undergone minor changes to meet regional security needs, which precludes fundamental change at this stage. It also argues that the tension between the moral-normative imperative and the security imperative, on the one hand, and the principle of dual non-interference (political and military), on the other, constitute two major dilemmas confronting Algerian politics and security doctrine. Starting from these two elements, the article, after setting out my concept of the subject, examines the formation and nature of Algerian politics, ideology, and transformations. It then looks at the constitutional decision on the participation of Algerian armed forces in international peacekeeping operations, analysing their context (domestic and foreign), their motives and justifications, and the reservations they face. Finally, it analyses Algeria's regional security strategy as an alternative to intervention. The article comes to three main conclusions. First, there is a limited adjustment to the issue of external interference depending on the needs of the security interest. Second, the end of the absolute refusal to use armed forces outside the borders. Third, it is likely that the tension between moral-normative and security considerations will escalate if the unrest continues within its geographical boundaries.

This study raises several pressing questions: Was the fall of the Salvation Regime in Sudan the result of an internal initiative or the opposition coalition, or both? To what extent did external dynamics influence the overthrow of regime and the transition to democracy? Is the post-Salvation regime likely to follow a democratic trajectory, or will it turn into another authoritarian regime? The study concludes that it is likely that the agreed goal between the international powers and their authoritarian partners in the region is to move Sudan to a "hybrid" system, where the elements of the old authoritarian regime remain in power, while maintaining a minimum level of democracy. In addition, the ruling military-civilian coalition will find support from the United States and the European Union (and their regional allies), enabling it to dismantle the institutions of the former regime, accommodate a number of armed movements in the political process, and gradually integrate into the international (security and economic) system. Meanwhile, domestically, the transitional government will face challenges that may not only lead to the collapse of the transitional process, but also to the collapse of the Sudanese state itself.

This study discusses the possibility of bridging the gap between IR (International Relation) and Foreign Policy Analysis when studying the interaction between memory and apology in foreign policy. By dealing with apology as an expressive practice, not just as a tact between statesmen, this study argues that apology is an act used by states to express their attitudes toward their past memories. It presumes that examining the interaction on the theoretical level between concepts such as narrative identity, ontological security, and discursive representations would bridge the gap between the two fields through two versions of social constructivism. Those two versions are then used to understand the motives behind Germany's apology to Israel, and Turkey's resistance to apologize to Armenia despite international pressure to do so. The study concludes that "critical constructivism" approach by Nizar Messari can explain the German case. It considers the role of foreign policy as a tool in reconstructing national identity through transforming representation of the Jewish/Israeli "other" from a "different other", who is an enemy of the self, to a "similar other", who is a part of its moral responsibility. As for Turkey, it concludes that Ted Hopf's "practical/societal constructivism" suggests that the reasons behind Turkey's unwillingness to apologize to Armenia is due to an ontological need best understood as "a need to preserve the routine of its narrative identity, and the need to preserve it heroic memories".

This study employs digital sociology approaches to trace networked communities and the contexts of their formation, development, or disintegration in relation to the social and political environment in which they emerge, with a particular focus on the impact of their culture on shaping public opinion in Morocco. The study assumes that contemporary communities, despite the digital nature of their medium, remain structurally connected to their traditional meaning grounded in similarity and cohesion, while being reconfigured within a networked society that fosters the rise of a "mass self". Based on network analysis, the study explores the transition of the individual from an autonomous unit to an active "collective person" within decentralized networked spaces that have contributed to reshaping the relationship between power and society, and between individuals and institutions. It also highlights the shift of political and symbolic conflict to the networked sphere and the emergence of new forms of participation, mobilization, and influence, turning networked communities into a social force capable of shapin – and at times producing – public opinion.

This study advances a new approach to theorizing the Arab state after the popular uprisings. It does this in two steps. Suspending the western European model of state formation and bringing the Arab world's experience in conversation with other parts of the Global South, it examines alternative state formation and state building sequences, trajectories, and temporalities in the making of Arab states. It thus historicizes the process of state formation and state building in the Arab world as compared to the western European one and other regions in the Global South. This first step liberates us from explicit and implicit comparisons with the European model of state formation. The second step surveys alternative theorizations of the Arab state after the uprisings. Tracing the causal assumptions embedded in these theories reveals how much they rely on the European model of state formation and state building as an implicit point of analytic departure and critical comparison. This survey unpacks the assumptions these theories make about the state, the difference between states and regimes, state and non-state actors, the private and public realms, and the formal and informal sectors. The objective of this study is to not only de-exceptionalize states in the Arab world, but, more importantly, borrowing from Gurminder Bhambra, 'unmake' our understandings of state formation and state building in the Arab world and thus contribute, following Walter Mignolo, to a knowledge production that serves a form of 'epistemic reconstitution' of alternative historical trajectories and possibilities.

This section lists the most prominent political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish a number of documents from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya for the period July–August 2022.

This article examines how the Hirak illustrates a renewal of nation-building and civic practices in contemporary Algeria. To do so, it takes a look at the use of history and identity during the mobilization of 2019 and 2020. The Hirak has produced a joint social and political distinction process through the exchanges of discourses and representations about Algeria's history in a moment of contentious politics; doing so, the Hirak has used portraits of former political figures and historical events to propose an alternate view of Algeria's history, now appropriated by the people. Concerning identity, the widespread use of the Berber flag and solidarity practices throughout the national territory, following its informal ban, shows the emergence of a pluralist conception of the Algerian society. The paper concludes that Algerians are on the way to establish a polity beyond primordialism and patron-client's relationships, and that a modern citizens' nationhood is on the brink of emergence.