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Using a realist approach, this study explains the development of international institutions in the Arab system, taking the Arab League and the Arab Monetary Fund as case studies. It puts to the test realist assumptions regarding states as major actors in the international system and examines how the principle of chaos and the absence of central authority affect their behaviour. In this context, the prisoner's dilemma is used as a mirror for security interactions and chaotic structures in the Arab and international systems. The study shows that realist assumptions are not sufficient to explain the development of Arab institutions; they need to be modified to explain the variation in international behaviour in the region. The conclusions of the paper are based on an analysis of the reward environment in which Arab countries interact, and its division into a security-military sphere and a political-economic sphere.

This study examines the role of identity, ideas, norms, and interests in shaping the Arab regional order across different historical periods, building on Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach. It critically evaluates both the explanatory power and inherent constraints of this approach in explaining regional dynamics within the Arab region. The study focuses on pivotal junctures linked to major events such as the Baghdad Pact (1955), the 1967 defeat, the Gulf War (1990), the Iraq invasion (2003), and the Arab Spring (2011). It demonstrates how these events reshaped regional identities through competing narratives and dominant dichotomies, where actors' legitimacy depended on their ability to impose narratives and redefine core issues. The study concludes that identity politics and normative frameworks played a central role in shaping regional policies and dynamics. Regional conflicts mainly manifested as struggles over ideational factors and positional roles rather than crude power maximization. Although constructivism offers valuable insights into how identity shapes regional interactions, its explanatory scope remains partial. As with all IR theoretical perspectives, it emphasizes certain dimensions while neglecting others.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

This study analyses the dynamics of state fragility in Arab countries from 2006–2024 using the Fragile States Index (FSI, Fund for Peace) and World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The findings indicate that state fragility in the Arab world is complex and multidimensional, influenced by domestic structural factors, as well as internal and external shocks. Despite an overall increase in fragility, variations were observed among countries; Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Palestine experienced significant increases, while the Gulf countries remained stable, and Iraq and Morocco showed relative improvement. Based on inflection points in the regional FSI series, the study divides the dynamics of fragility into four phases: relative stability (2006-2011), rising fragility (2012-2016), stability at high fragility levels (2017-2020), and slight improvement in indicators (2021-2024). The findings indicate that higher poverty, malnutrition, and low education exacerbate fragility, whereas improvements in GDP per capita, education, health, and economic openness help reduce it. The study highlights that addressing fragility requires long-term policies focused on enhancing governance, social justice, economic diversification, and human development to build more resilient Arab societies in the face of crises.

The book analyzes China's strategy toward Arab states, exploring its objectives, tools, and implications. The author examines China's strategic goals, its vision for the Arab world, and the methods used to achieve these aims.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

Although the academic study of International Relations (IR) in the Arab world has been ongoing for almost seventy years, there remains a dearth of information regarding its origins that can be attributed, in part, to a lack of research on the state of the field. The present study seeks to address this gap by conducting an examination of the state of IR in the Arab World over the course of a century. Additionally, this study proposes a novel method for evaluating the current state of the field and assessing its scientific output. To achieve these objectives, the study applies sociological generational analysis to three generations of Arab IR scholars, then examines their contributions to four key aspects of the field: the scientific production cycle, the formation of the scientific community, the development of its institutional structure, and relative autonomy from political science.

Has the 2011 Constitution Stalled the Democratic Transition of Morocco?

Establishing a genuine and effective system to settle disputes through ministerial conferences is an essential point of progress for developing countries. Such a system would mean these states– and Arab countries in particular – would defend their rights based on a legal rather than economic basis. This paper argues that developing countries’ inability to benefit fully from the advantages of a dispute settlement system poses an essential and fundamental problem. It shows how the World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement system has failed to become an effective tool in the hands of developing countries to repair imbalances resulting from unequal economic relations between countries. It then asks why developing countries – including Arab countries – have taken part in this system. It examines the root cause of this participation, asking wither it is due to subjective factors such as limited contribution in WTO or the lack of specialized national talents? Or objective obstacles that the system places before developing countries, especially in terms of long and demanding procedures, as well as the nature of the implementation process. The paper encourages a reconsideration of the system in order to keep it in line with the positions and potentials of developing countries. In its approach, this paper adopts analysis at two levels; the first looking into the outcome of the participation of developing countries in dispute settlement, and the second a reading of plans to reform the structures of the system.

This paper will examine the situation which can be described as the “Blockade of Qatar”, and particularly the legal ramifications of this blockade and the avenues of action available through international law channels and intra-state apparatus. The paper is premised on the argument that the deliberate, multilateral actions taken by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt against Qatar are not only punitive, but also represent a violation of the principles of international law and of the foundations for the relations between states in times of crisis. Given the use of force to enforce the blockade, the political and economic boycott of Qatar by a group of countries in the region could be legally defined as punitive measures. This paper concludes that the actions taken by the group of countries blockading Qatar provide an adequate basis for the activation of international mechanisms for international arbitration. Specifically, the author contends that Qatar would be justified in pursuing political and judicial redress against the group of countries concerned.