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Following a return to armed conflict, the Turkish authorities abandoned, in 2015, a policy of political reconciliation with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The new approach is based on, first, the idea that no capable Kurdish negotiating partner exists for the Ankara authorities to negotiate with. Secondly, it is based on a full-scale military confrontation against the PKK and on weakening the Democratic Peoples' Party (HDP) through a variety of means. Thirdly, the new approach is based on an openness to alternative Kurdish groups to represent the Kurds in the future and is also based on strengthening the Kurdish conservatives. Despite the achievements of the AKP and the incumbent government in this regard, they continue to face on-the-ground challenges. This paper seeks to answer a set of questions: Can the HDP be weakened or lost in future parliamentary representation, or will it still represent a large segment of Kurds? Would support for the AKP's Kurdish allies be enough to allow them to negotiate on behalf of Turkey's Kurdish population? How feasible is the AKP government's present approach and how successful is it?

An analysis of the results of the 19th Israeli Knesset elections, held in January 2013, indicates a continuation of the political and social changes currently underway in Israeli politics, such as the decline of the major parties and the continuation of traditional voting patterns in Israel. On the other hand, new transformations have been noted, most importantly the dominance of the right on the Israeli political scene. The elections showed the lack of an alternative to the Likud Party. For the first time there was no other party to compete with it to form the government. This came in the context of the increasing strength of the new right in Israel and the decline in the camp of the leftist parties. The election results also showed for the first time the preponderance of the socio-economic factor in determining how to vote, whereas previously the political-security factor had been dominant in determining electoral behavior. This change led the Israeli middle classes to strongly back the Yesh Atid party, which placed the interests of the middle class at the center of its social discourse. Overall, the study makes clear that the analytic of left and right is inadequate for understanding voting patterns in Israeli elections.

Book Title: Abdullah Gul and the Making of the New Turkey [English] Author: Gerald MacLean Year of publication: 2014 Publisher: One World - London Pages: 368 (large format)

The dominant-party system as theorized by political literature is examined through the case of Israel. At first glance, the 2015 elections in Israel reinforce the view that the country is in transformation to a dominant party system, rather than a stage where a dominant party governs it. This confirms the theoretical political literature, which also makes this distinction. The paper argues that the current stage may be a prelude to the dominant-party stage, especially if Israeli policies continue down their current path. The path in question undermines the democratic foundations of the Israeli political system, cementing right-wing discourse as the dominant position in both state and the public sphere. This trend is likely to continue so long as opposing camps remain entrenched. Regional and international climates reinforce the right's discourse; which Netanyahu has strengthened during his years in power. If his successful policy of managing the conflict with the Palestinians without reaching a solution or paying a price continues, this trend will become further entrenched. In four sections, this paper overviews the theoretical debate regarding the notion of the dominant-party system, analyses the results of the general election in Israel, then presents a sociological analysis of the election results. It concludes with a discussion of the results in the context of the concept of the dominant-party system.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

This research tried to explore different stages of the Zionist "penetration" of British political circles, and to identify the strategies and tactics, which were employed by the "Zionist lobby" organisations in order to win over the British public. The focus of this research was on the Zionist lobby organisations’ methods in Britain, where pro-Israel organisations run "soft" and "hard" pressure tools including publicity, propaganda, direct advertising, editorial advertising, public relations, and funding, to influence the attitude of the British public. The research found that the the pro-Israel lobby had intensified its activities in the last decade, to counter a British public opinion that appeared to have become more sympathetic and understanding of the Palestinian narrative.

This paper explores the concept of “the Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), an outcome of the 2005 World Summit which entails that the international community has a moral duty to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states in cases involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. The author illustrates the historical legacy of the R2P, covering how early legal philosophers justified the intervention of European powers through theories such as just war, intervention in the name of humanity, and humanitarian intervention, before exploring whether R2P represents a violation of well-established principles of international law: the sovereignty of states and non-intervention in their affairs and the non-use of force in international affairs. The paper concludes that R2P does not provide for the use of force in a manner that does not already exist in the UN Charter.

Early in the transitional justice process during and after the Tunisian revolution, the need arose to develop a full-fledged legal framework guaranteeing the rights of victims and, at the same time, of perpetrators. However, no sooner was transitional justice legislation ratified than progress towards the objective faltered. In an atmosphere of partisan political turbulence, the legislation resulted in weak outcomes. This led to the conclusion that the foremost problem of transitional justice does not lie in an absence of political will as much as in the philosophy on which it is founded. This philosophy adheres to liberal democratic values in facing the painful past and restoring rights to victims of despotism – by stipulating a set of rights that put the victim and the executioner on the same footing, without the slightest consideration of the balance of power between them. Consequently, perpetrators and torturers tend to dodge justice and recognition of truth, equating reconciliation with accountability.