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With the expansion of donor entities and the growth of their various activities, the questions about foreign aid and the strategic objectives behind it have become essential. This paper asks the following questions: Why do donor entities provide aid to poor countries? What are the most important objectives of these donors? Are humanitarian motives the main factor determining the conduct of donors? Theoretical and empirical studies have addressed these questions in depth from various theoretical backgrounds looking at many areas of the world, but there remains no agreement regarding the most important motives and objectives governing the conduct of donor countries in providing aid to poor countries. This paper seeks to answer these questions by reviewing, analyzing, and adapting the most important studies in international development and international relations to highlight the most important features of the global debate on this issue.

​Over the past decades, the four Gulf states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar—have emerged as active donor countries, playing prominent roles in fragile and conflict-affected areas in the humanitarian, developmental, and peace-related fields. While most of their foreign aid is visible in humanitarian and development sectors, their peace-related assistance remains directionally unclear and lacks sufficient analysis due to the absence of an official documentation system issued by Gulf donors in this area. To address this gap, this paper examines the foreign aid flows of Gulf donor countries through the lens of the Humanitarian- Development-Peace Triple Nexus. The analysis suggests that Gulf donor countries do not align their aid with the reform movement led by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the HDP Triple Nexus. The results reveal that the challenges to fully implementing this approach in the foreign aid policies of these countries include weak coordination among Gulf donors, the absence thereof, inadequate exchange of data, information, and joint .analysis, in addition to operating within a framework of bilateral funding.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

Beginning with a review of existing theories of international relations that discuss policies of penetration, this study examines current politics of the Arab regional order. Four different aspects of penetration are reviewed, including intra-Arab threats, rivalry between Arab states to occupy a central position, historical legacy, and multinational companies. The role of Arab elites in processes of penetration by means of their links with international powers and interests is also considered. The study looks at ‘soft’ penetration through an analysis of language, education, media, and civil society organizations, as well as “blatant penetration” like the occupation of Iraq and the spread of foreign military bases. Beyond Arab state actions, the paper also considers intervention by neighboring regional states. The paper finds that variation in the development of political, social, and economic systems has a corresponding influence on the levels of foreign penetration, infiltration, or influence. It also finds that analyzing the Arab region as a single regional system reveals a deep level of military, social, and economic penetration on all levels.

​This paper aims to analyze European Gulf relations based on the Interdependence created by the 1988 agreement, and the subsequent transformations in the relationships. The interdependence approach assumes that there is an overlap of interests between both parties, and a degree of mutual engagement, thus limiting conflict and enhancing cooperation and coordination, which entails harmonizing the movement of its parties within the international system. Nonetheless testing the effectiveness of this approach in the context of a crisis which divides one of the parties (the Gulf in our case) remains problematic. The paper tries to probe this issue, and reveal the limitations of the interdependence model in this context. It similarly attempts to test the impact of the Gulf Crisis on a European Sub Policy towards the Gulf by analyzing the behaviours of the main actors in the EU (Germany, France, and- despite brexit- the UK).

The purpose of this paper is to document Qatar's recent contribution of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. We consider Qatar as an example of a mini state that relies on its wealth and soft power to further its interests in the Middle East and support a beleaguered Arab-Muslim state. The paper carries out analysis of Arabic newspapers and other documentary evidence to contextualize and estimate Qatar's financial contribution from 2010 to 2016. Contextualizing Qatar's aid necessitates considering Israel's military control of the Palestinian Territories, and its ability through hard power to regulate the inflow of aid to Palestine. The paper concludes by calling for adopting the political economy perspective in dealing with humanitarian aid.

This study traces the evolution and divergence of state–society relations in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of social pacts and welfare regimes. It asks how governments across the region have responded to popular mobilization during and after the Arab uprisings, and what these responses reveal about the nature of the Arab state – or, more accurately, Arab states – in the region. By situating post-uprising developments within longer post-independence trajectories, the study traces sharply divergent paths since 2010. These varied responses underscore the absence of a single "Arab state" model. Instead, welfare regimes and social pacts across different types of political economies in the region reflect at least three distinct models of Arab statehood. In the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, fiscal surpluses sustain generous welfare systems and ambitious development strategies, while rulers cautiously promote expanded roles for the private sector under tight control. In middle-income states, initial post-uprising concessions, such as expanded social spending and employment, quickly gave way to austerity, debt crises, targeted assistance, and rising repression, resulting in declining welfare provision and shrinking opportunities for the middle class. In low-income and conflict-affected countries, protracted wars and state fragmentation have devastated welfare infrastructures, leaving humanitarian actors to fill governance vacuums.

This study builds on the assumption that any change in the structure of the international system in the foreseeable future cannot be immediately ascribed to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, even if the pandemic is purely incidental and unable to change the existing distribution of power, this does not mean it has not introduced a dialogue within International Relations on the impact of epidemics on the structure of the international system, and their ability to intensify some essential - economic, social, and political - factors that contribute to international system change. International power balances before the outbreak of the pandemic indicate the beginning of change of the international system, as if it has been moving towards multipolarity, particularly with many rising powers, such as China, Russia and the European Union, whose international interests challenge those of the US, especially as the latter persistently impedes any rise of rival powers in the foreseeable future.

The paper investigates and analyzes the regional and international interactions with the conflict in Libya, focusing on the period following the December 2015 political agreement in Skhirat, Morocco. The paper argues that this agreement is the result of a limited consensus among domestic and regional forces. These forces have moulded their foreign policies, over the course of the conflict, based on a balance between concerns over the political and economic effects of the Libyan democratic transition and their interests and ambitions for greater control and influence. The conflict of interests between the external forces was a substantial factor along with other internal determinants that have contributed to obstructing the democratic transition process. Therefore, this paper explores a series of research questions, mainly focusing on the role and behavior of the influential external forces in Libya's domestic politics.

This study monitors the role of external factors in the stability of Moroccan authoritarianism and controling the liberalization methods pursued by the government over two stages: the final years of the Cold War and the 2011 Arab Spring. As much as these factors contributed to widening the margin of liberalization in the Moroccan political arena, they also contributed to limiting this liberalization (September 11, the post-2013 counterrevolutionary movement), especially given the lack of internal will to mature it. While it is true that these factors have made an impact, this remained within certain limits that allowed actors abroad (the United States, the European Union and donor institutions) to control the transformations of Moroccan politics and to manage contradictions, thus creating an environment hostile to democratic transition in Morocco.