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This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the ​intersection of these three approaches.

This paper examines the variables that could affect the attitude of armies towards revolutions. These variables are numerous and diverse, and they differ depending on the nature of the armies and the societies from which they emerge, as well as the international climate in which they exist. As such, the paper argues that the fate of revolutions is determined - with rare exceptions - by the attitude of the army in terms of its bias toward the revolution or toward the existing regime confronting it. The paper also explores societal factors and their role in determining the behavior of the army and its attitude towards revolution, especially in societies characterized by ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The paper looks to Syria as a clear model of the phenomenon within the context of Arab revolutions and uprisings. The paper concludes that the ease or difficulty of predicting the behavior of armies towards revolutions varies between different cases given the multiplicity of factors that could affect it.

The Palestinian Authority today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy, has led to a situation in which the PA's days may be numbered. This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the PA's promised territory. But Palestinian society today has undergone immense transformation since 1994; Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, and its formalized institutions which have overtaken Palestinian society for the past two decades disappear, how will Palestinians respond? Will the territories degenerate into violence, or will Palestinians coordinate to undertake strategies to organize a Palestinian response? This brief review Palestinian public opinion on preferences for non-violent strategies versus violent strategies, and examines what variables impact this dynamic.

This paper addresses problematic aspects of the concept of "terrorism" from within its present-day setting, exploring the futile conflict between "terrorism" and "counter-terrorism" which has been utilized to marginalize the discourse on democracy, justice and national liberation. The paper argues that the categorization of an event as a terrorist act based on the identity of the perpetrator, and regardless of the victims, leads to a logical fallacy. One consequence of categorizing all armed acts by non-state actors as "terrorist" is the erosion of distinctions between terrorist acts and acts of national liberation, resistance to foreign occupation and armed opposition to state violence against civilians. One conclusion of the paper is that blurring the distinctions between terrorist and legitimate acts is counterproductive to the war on terror.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

The Gulf states, as a center for oil and gas production, face the challenge of adapting to an increasingly uncertain energy landscape as new resources arrive in the market, and the reverberations of unstable demand and turbulent geostrategic conditions. The great challenge for these countries, in which social peace depends on unlimited consumption of subsidized energy, is to reduce consumption and develop alternative energy sources to conserve traditional fuels for export. The effects of these transformations are significant today, and the economic, social and political stability of these countries, as well as their ability to remain major players in the global energy system is at stake. Renewable energy policies, tailored to the unique political, economic and social conditions of each country, need to translate aspirations into swift practical action to succeed and rejuvenate the option of cooperation within a productive institutional framework.

​If deterrence fails and diplomacy falters, how can small states defend themselves against adversaries that outnumber, outgun and outmatch them? This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discourse on how "the few" can achieve a military upset - not just a political or a propaganda one- against "the many." In an era where asymmetric war has become the most anticipated type, understanding the innovative ways of warfare that enable the smaller forces to endure and even prevail is of paramount importance to strategic analysts, military commanders, and policymakers alike. To do so, the study coins a definition for the concept of "Hybrid Defence," contributes a new definition of "Multi-Domain Combined Arms Operations" and examines their correlations with, and impacts on, "Military Effectiveness" and "Combat Effectiveness." It then analyses selected operational arts and tactical adaptations employed by the relatively smaller forces - such as the Ukrainian Military and Security Forces, as well as nonstate forces, exemplified by the Palestinian Resistance Factions in Gaza - for confronting numerically and technologically superior adversaries. The study extracts seven key lessons and concludes with their comparative implications for the defence policies of small states, particularly in the Arab world and beyond.

The Palestinian Authority today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy, has led to a situation in which the PA's days may be numbered. This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the PA's promised territory. But Palestinian society today has undergone immense transformation since 1994; Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before. If the Palestinian Authority collapses, and its formalized institutions which have overtaken Palestinian society for the past two decades disappear, how will Palestinians respond? Will the territories degenerate into violence, or will Palestinians coordinate to undertake strategies to organize a Palestinian response? This brief review Palestinian public opinion on preferences for non-violent strategies versus violent strategies, and examines what variables impact this dynamic.

Scholars studying the Middle East often challenge the IR discipline's Eurocentric framings of the world by emphasizing the particularities of the Middle East, which defy and challenge the universality of Western-rooted IR theories. Social constructivism, focusing on agency and processes, has been regarded by many as an approach with the potential of taking into consideration specific historical, ideational, and cultural contexts in the Middle East region. Social constructivism, as developed by Alexander Wendt (1992 , 1994 , 1999), seems to lend itself especially well to adaptations to provide insights for the Middle East. This article revisits some aspects of Wendt's constructivism and explores its applicability in the Middle East. The article examines Wendt's cultures of anarchy to show how cooperative relations transform into conflict through processes of interaction. I examine how the Middle East provides both a potential and challenge to his argument by examining the case of Saudi relations with Hamas, with a particular focus on the episode of the 2009 Gaza war. The article examines the puzzle of how Saudi Arabia changed and evolved over the years from supporting Hamas and the Palestinian resistance to identifying it as an enemy, despite sharing pan-Islamism as a collective identity.

Politicians are increasingly adopting populist rhetoric that is appealing to people's emotions and biases rather than their rational judgments. This rhetoric includes claims of representing the people (us) as opposed to the establishment and the traditional elite (them). Anti-elitist populism manifests in its opposition to facts, with populists becoming the main players who distort facts and spread disinformation. Therefore, populism and disinformation reinforce one other, creating a cycle of manipulation that undermines democracy. By conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of the speeches of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Egypt and Kais Saied in Tunisia, this study argues that there are four tactics, rely on disinformation, used by authoritarian populists to legitimize the obstruction of constitutional and institutional constraints and suppress the opposition: (1) constructing the people by creating the enemy; (2) attacking the media and democratic institutions; (3) creating illusion by amplifying achievements; and (4) employing conspiracy theory and misinformation to justify failure at fulfilling promises.