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The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954 - 1958 , which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

The study focuses on civil-military relations in Egypt since 2013 , examining measures the regime employs to achieve three objectives: controlling the military to prevent coups, thwarting political mobilization that could lead to popular uprisings akin to the January Revolution, and securing ongoing external support. The study concludes that these measures have brought about fundamental changes. Firstly, they have restructured the political regime towards a personalist regime led by one man, a close-knit elite, and loyalists. Secondly, they have threatened military unity with the emergence of parallel armed entities, notably Sinai's tribal union. Thirdly, they have undermined state sovereignty through expanding debts, selling state assets, and making other concessions to foreign backers. The analysis reveals that concessions granted to the military to ensure loyalty have also strengthened its independence, potentially paving the way for various scenarios if the presidential office becomes vacant or public discontent erupts due to mismanagement of state affairs.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The failure of the 15th of July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey will remain an exceptional landmark in Turkey’s modern history, as well as in the political legacy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Declaring the state of emergency, arresting thousands of individuals, temporarily dismissing tens of thousands of governmental employees for investigation, shutting down a number of universities and Islamic endowments under the pretext of fighting the “parallel state”, besides calling for the reconstruction of the military establishment, necessitates analyzing the possible repercussions of this coup attempt on Turkish political life. The paper will address this coup’s consequences by discussing the following: battling the “parallel state”, reconstructing the military establishment, writing a new constitution, and predicting possible turns in Turkish foreign policy.

This paper discusses the position taken by Israeli elite in welcoming the military coup in Egypt. It asks to what extent this attitude reflects the official Israeli position, even if it is not publicly announced. The paper outlines the intense efforts undertaken by Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and the ruling Israeli elite, which deployed both international relations and diplomatic capabilities to secure recognition for the Egyptian government that came after the coup, especially from the US Administration. The paper explains the Israeli position, highlighting Israel's interest in supporting the coup; from restoring the strategic partnership with Egypt, to breathing life into the axis of 'Arab moderation,' draining the financial resources of Islamist movements, besieging Hamas, stimulating peace negotiations, delaying a resolution in Syria, expanding the rift and polarization in the Arab World, and tightening the noose around Iran, as well as a host of economic benefits that are even now being accrued.

By analysing qualitative and archival primary sources, this paper examines intra-military relations in Syria during the period in which Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (1961 - 1963). It explores the consequences of the failure to apply what can be described as "Concordance Theory", particularly regarding the impact of military divisions on civil-military relations, and how these divisions led to dangerous fragmentation within the military institution itself. Additionally, it examines the role these divisions played in the disintegration of the political system during the secession, without neglecting the social and political conditions that influenced these developments. The paper highlights the emergence of the Damascene 'Shwam' officers' faction as a result of policies aimed at containing and dismantling military factions during the unity period, and how this faction managed to lead the secession coup. It also analyses how this elite failed to maintain control over the army and government institutions, with their efforts to assert control giving rise to competing coup factions, ultimately leading to the collapse of military leadership and the loss of command and control. This paved the way for the military coup on 8 March 1963.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.

This section lists the most prominent political documents related to the democratic transition in the Arab world. In this issue we publish documents related to the reaction of Tunisian political currents on the issue of dissolving parliament and dismissing the government, the reaction of the coordination framework of Shiite forces rejecting the election results in Iraq, and the reaction of the Sudanese government and the Sudanese Association to the coup measures taken by the President of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan . We will stop when the documents are published between September 1 and October 31, 2021.

ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف أﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻮز/ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ 2013. وﺗﺨﺘﺒﺮ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﻬﺎ، وﺗﺠﺎدل ﺑﺄﻧ ﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻀﻴﻴﻖ واﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﻘﻮى واﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﻓﺈن ﺛﻤﺔ أﺷﻜﺎﻟ ﺎ وأﻧﻤﺎﻃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ واﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻇﻬﺮت ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻘﻤﻌﻴﺔ. وﻗﺪ راوﺣﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻧﻤﺎط وا ﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺳﻠﻤﻴﺔ وأﺧﺮى ﻋﻨﻴﻔﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺣﻘﻮﻗﻴﺔ. ﻟﺬا ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ وأﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ودرﺟﺎﺗﻪ، وﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﻳﺆدي إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج أم زﻳﺎدﺗﻪ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪه، ﺑﻄﺮق وأﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻧﻘﻼب 2013، اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ، ﻣﺼﺮ. This study explores political mobilization in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013, and the way in which regime oppression shaped the responses of political forces within the country. The author argues that novel and varied forms of political mobilization have emerged in Egypt in the past few years in spite of regime oppression. The nature of the response was also dictated on the relevant group’s focus. This paper shall attempt to unravel the dialectical relationship between state repression and political dissent in Egypt, seeking to determine the ways in which state repression shapes the form and intensity of political dissent