Latest Articles

The author here examines the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian political process after the victory of the January 25 Revolution with a focus on former president Mohamed Morsi's one year in office. The paper begins by analyzing the structural developments and accompanying political strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood while it was a force in the country's political opposition, and how the party reflected on its behavior after the January Revolution in general, but especially during Morsi's reign. The paper focuses on what is considered an exceptional moment in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood: when it went from being an opposition group to taking power in a formal government setting. It examines this extraordinary shift in light of the major challenges of managing the Egyptian state. The paper concludes that the Muslim Brotherhood will not disappear from the political scene given its deep integration into the Egyptian social fabric, and discusses strategies and paths that the organization could adopt in the post-coup era.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

By studying Tunisian foreign policy in the decade after the 2010 popular uprisings, this article contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations influence foreign policy roles. The article first demonstrates how achieved roles develop expectations among regional states as the audience. Then it explains how these expectations condition role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by neutrality in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interests. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states.

This study investigates the role of the police apparatus in Egypt during the 2011 revolution and the subsequent counter-revolution following the 2013 coup. It begins by examining the relationships between the Military Council, President Mohamed Morsi, and the police apparatus. The study then explores how the Ministry of Interior and its security agencies reverted to their previous repressive practices, including extrajudicial killings and torture. The research highlights that the security apparatus remained fragmented, marked by overlapping authorities and a focus on resource competition rather than coordination. However, the existential threat posed by the 2011 revolution compelled the apparatus to unify against the tangible threat of popular unrest. Following 2013 , the military, security and intelligence agencies furthered the suppression of opposition in various forms, largely evading accountability.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

ﻓﻲ ﺧﻀﻢ اﺧﺬ واﻟﺮدّ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤّﻰ إﻋﻼﻣﻴًﺎ "ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ"، ﺑﻴﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ا رﺑﻊ؛ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ، وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﺑﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻃﺮق ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻂ اﻟﻀﻮء ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. وﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﺧﺘﻼط اوراق ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪ، اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﻚ وإﻋﺎدة اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺐ؛ ن ﺛﻤﺔ "ﺗﺸﺎﺑﻜ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ، و"اﺷﺘﺒﺎﻛ ﺎ" ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﺧﺮى، وﺛﻤﺔ "إﺟﻬﺎض" ﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ ﻋﺮﺑﻲﱟ ﻣﺄﻣﻮلٍ، وﺛﻤﺔ دﻛﺘﺎﺗﻮرﻳﺔ ﺿﺎرﺑﺔ ﺟﺬورﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ، وﻫﻨﺎك ﻗﻮى ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎوﻫﺎم، وأﻃﺮوﺣﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﺼﺮ. ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ وﺻﻒ اﻟﺨﻼﻓﺎت ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻄﺮ واﻟﺪول ارﺑﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﺎد اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻌﺾ أنّ ﻛﻞ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺘﺎرﻳﺦ أﺻﺒﺢ وراء اﻟﺠﻤﻴﻊ، وﺗﻢّ ﺗﺠﺎوزه ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺠﺪات اﻟﺘﻲ أﺣﺪﺛﻬﺎ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺤﺪﻳﺜﺔ، وﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﺻﻴﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ دﻗﻴﻖ ﺑﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﺗﺠﺪد ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺤﺪة أﺷﺪ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴﺔ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، اﺧﻮان اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻮن، ارﻫﺎب. This paper will attempt to approach the present crisis between Qatar and a group of four countries formed of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt from a number of perspectives. The complexity of the present situation means that a process of deconstruction is required before the problem can be solved. Specifically, the present crisis reveals how the countries involved are both intertwined and in conflict, simultaneously; and how the players in question are in conflict over attempts to undo the Arab Spring. The conflicts between Qatar and the remaining countries have roots which stretch into history, and they also demonstrate that any belief that the birth of the modern nation-state would end those rivalries was misguided.

This study analyzes the path of Egypt’s January 25 Revolution and its missed opportunity for regime change. In making this case the paper begins by examining the early conflict between political parties, and the role of the former regime’s armed forces in lending legitimacy to different actors. The study also addresses the structure - or lack thereof - of the transitional phase, including the role of the Islamist movement, and the predicament that the Muslim Brotherhood faced while in power. Continuing to trace the path of the stymied revolution, this paper assesses the failures, in particular of the political parties that “inherited” the young revolutionary generation, to comprehend the meaning of the transitional phase. As such, it shows how these parties failed to make progress towards democracy, and to understand the role assigned to them immediately after the January events. The study reasserts the meaning of the terms “revolution” and “coup,” exposing the ongoing confusion around the characterization of what happened in the post-transition phase in July 2013. It also analyzes the efforts of counterrevolutionary forces to pit the “legitimacy of the street” against the “legitimacy of the people.” The paper finally comes to forecast the direction the Egyptian revolution might take, given the July 3rd ouster of Mohamed Morsi, and the events that followed.