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This study argues that relying on the United States for of security and defense has led to the neglect of the Arab Gulf states to varying degrees. These countries failed to build an independent regional security capacity or develop broad security relations with third parties besides the United States. Since President Barack Obama took office in 2009-2016, before Donald Trump replaced him, questioning the regional balance of power, this reliance has destabilized the most stable part of the Arab world. This study examines the implications of the unprecedented regional reality regarding the strategic and security relations between the United States and the Gulf in the context of the divergent views of Washington and its local partners on regional security management methods, in particular the role of the GCC in managing peace and security.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

Why is the GCC, which is now in its fourth decade, still a weak defensive organization? This paper tries to explain the dilemmas of collective security in the Arab Gulf region. The paper first elucidates the concept of collective security, which forms the theoretical framework for this study. It then reviews the main sources of threat to Gulf security. It then offers a discussion of security dimensions and defense cooperative between the GCC states, and a detailed analysis of the dilemmas of collective security in the GCC, as well as of the features of the proposed collective security system.

ﺗﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺮض اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ا ﻟﺰاﻣﻴﺔ وﺧﻄﻮات ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دولٍ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻟﺪول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ؛ ﻗﻄﺮ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، واﻟﺘﻲ أﻋﺎدت ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ دام ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻋﺎﻣًﺎ. وﺗﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ اﻟﻬﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﺒﺎب، وﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻴﺤﻪ ﻟﻘﻮات اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎط ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺖ ﻣﺆﺧﺮًا أﻛﺜﺮ ﻧﺸﺎﻃ ﺎ ﺧﺎرج ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ، ﻓﻀﻠ ﺎ ﻋﻦ أن اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻄﺐ وﻳﺪرب ﺷﺒﺎﻧ ﺎ ﻏﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﺘﻘﺮون إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢ، وﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮن ﻋﺎﻃﻠﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻣﻌﺘﻠﻲ اﻟﺼﺤﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻣﺎرات، اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ. This article explores the introduction and implementation of mandatory military service, in three of the six Gulf monarchies that constitute the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Two of these states, Qatar and the UAE, have never before imposed conscription while the third, Kuwait, decided to reintroduce it after a fifteen-year hiatus. The new policy, the essay argues, has been motivated by several reasons. First, conscription will build up the reserve forces of these states that have recently become more active in projecting military power beyond their borders. Second, it will strengthen national identity and the political socialization of young men and, to a lesser extent, women. Third, it will engage and train often poorly educated, unemployed, and unhealthy youths. Finally, the article contends, there is little chance of compulsory military service being introduced in the other three GCC states.

Today, India is actively engaged in projecting its influence beyond its geographic proximity. It has a proactive policy based on national interests and driven by its growing needs, particularly for energy imports, and an ambition to achieve a position of global prominence. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is of great geopolitical importance to India's strategy because of its geographic proximity, the abundance of energy resources, the great financial assets, and as the place with the largest Indian immigrant community. Nevertheless, many regional contenders may challenge India's interests in the region. This article discusses the geopolitical and economic importance of the GCC states and their current position in India's strategy. It explores the driving forces behind novel strategic partnerships between them. It also analyses how third-party relations with the GCC states or India may affect their relationships, such as China, Pakistan, and Iran. It also focuses on the new containment policy of India and China and their geopolitical contest over the Gulf and the GCC's hydrocarbon and financial assets.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

This study examines the ability of network technology to challenge despotism regimes. It thus applies two theoretical approaches. The first is the "Prisoner's dilemma" and the "despot/jailer's dilemma" and the second is the "case study", which studies a number of cases of "network technology", whether used by protest groups or by authoritarian regimes, to determine the extent (and direction) of their impact in practice. The study concludes that network technology — through challenging the logic of the "prisoner's dilemma" and reversing it to become the "jailer's dilemma" — can, theoretically, pose an element of weakness for despotism regimes. However, in reality, network technology can be used by these regimes with the same effectiveness, to respond to mass protests supported by technology. This indicates that network technology can be seen as a neutralizing factor, the impact of which should be studied relative to the impact of other factors.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.