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Armed Houthis under the banner of Ansar Allah took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa by force on September 11, 2014. This date represented a milestone on the path of changes witnessed by Yemen in the recent past and whose features were outlined from the beginning of 2011. This paper considers the factors and reasons that led to the fall of Yemen to the Houthis, such as the nature of the various divisions in Yemen, the roles of the army, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda, the truth about the conflict between the Houthis and the Islah Party, the dispute between president Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and prime minister Mohammed Salim Basindawa, the role of the Gulf states and Iran, and the ambitions of the Houthis. The paper also touches upon the outcome of the conflict and the future of Yemen in light of continued Houthi efforts to spread their control over the biggest possible part of the country.

Examining the conditions of active groups in the Yemeni political arena, this paper will highlight the groups' most important wagers in managing the conflict. The many groups, each carrying out vendettas against past acts, create complex intersections. The coalition of the "clique" and Al-Islah party with the General People's Congress Party in the war of the summer of 1994 is one example, as is the alliance between the Houthis and the former regime against the forces of February 11, 2011 that drove Saleh out of power. So too can the role of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in the confrontations with the Houthis in the six wars between 2004 and 2006 be read into the current political scenario. In explaining the division of national identity into southern and northern groups, and the popular mood against everything that is northern, the paper tackles the escalating sectarian conflict and the systematic undermining under Saleh's regime of the foundations of a modern civil state. It further addresses the weakening of modernizing forces in favor of traditional ones, and the weakening of the center in favor of the peripheries. The paper argues that any treatment that does not address these issues will be unsuccessful. It suggests that any political settlement among the warring parties could only postpone cyclical war and instability, and act as a gap for foreign intervention and tutelage.

This paper explores the roots and developments of the rivalry between the Houthis and the Salafis, based on the recent Houthi blockade and armed attack on Dammaj town in Saada governorate in north Yemen. Illustrated by the author is a sectarian map of the region and its three components: the dominant Zaidi sect and the two emerging sects in the region—Houthis and Salafis. The paper also sheds light on the historical circumstances that bred the status quo and tackles the Yemeni government’s sectarian manipulation during the rule of deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This led to the militarization of the region and turned it into a hot spot. The paper also describes the stance of the current government vis-à-vis the violence in Saada, and notes how its negative reaction could result in the expansion of strife in Yemen and could push the country into a civil war.

How is International Relations (IR) taught in the Arab World? What happens to what was once labelled an 'American Social Science' when it enters classrooms in the Arab world and is taught in Arabic? Despite the predominance of Western approaches and theories on the teaching of IR in the Arab World, there is tension between the need to train students in the classical theories as a prerequisite for knowledge production, and the need to adapt them to various political, social, and economic contexts across the globe. This study examines the different approaches to how IR is taught in Arab universities, and how Western theories are considered critically by the teaching of alternative approaches. The paper argues that the different approaches to teaching IR are more versatile theoretically than the range of published papers in leading academic journals in the West. As such, they may prove to be the starting point for new forms of knowledge production that better reflect the realities of international relations in the Arab world.

This study examines how the 2023 Gaza War reshaped maritime security dynamics and geopolitical rivalry in the Red Sea, particularly in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through a complex interplay between great powers and non-state actors. It demonstrates that the Houthi (Ansar Allah) attacks on commercial vessels –framed as support for Gaza – transformed the strait into a global flashpoint that exposed the vulnerability of international supply chains. The study also shows how these developments reactivated U.S.–China rivalry in the Red Sea: the United States adopted a military–security approach in support of Israel's war on Gaza and to reaffirm its role as guarantor of the maritime commons, while China favored a cautious strategy centered on economic influence, calculated non-involvement in military operations, and securing the passage of its vessels through discreet diplomatic channels. The study concludes that the Red Sea has become a space where U.S. naval dominance intersects with China's rising economic power, and where non-state actors increasingly shape regional and global security.

ﺗﺒﻨ ﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻮن اوروﺑﻴﻮن واﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﻮن واÈ ﻋﻼم واﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، ﺑﺤﻤﺎسٍ، ﺳﻨﺔ 2011، ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد ا وروﺑﻲ ﺑﺪﻋﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻮّل اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺑﺴﺨﺎء. وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻟﻢ ﻳﺮقَاوروﺑﻴﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى وﻋﻮدﻫﻢ؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ودوﻟﻪ اﻋﻀﺎء، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺤﺮب اﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان، واﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻓﻲ أﺧﺮى، إﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻔﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ ﻋﻮارض ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات. وﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﺆﺛ ﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، أﺛ ﺮت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ. ﺗﺤﻠﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﻨﺎﻫﺞ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ "اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ"، وأدواﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ، وأوﻟﻮﻳﺎﺗﻪ، وﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪى اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اورﺑﻲ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﻮﻧﺲ. In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. Te EU pledged to generously support transformation processes initiated in the region. Yet, Europeans – as other third parties – have not lived up to their promises. Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings turning into violence and civil war in some countries and authoritarian restoration in others, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Indeed, rather than the EU impacting on the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring, these dynamics have strongly impacted on Europe. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper analyzes the EU's approaches, instruments and priorities – and how the latter have changed over the course of the last years.

It is not easy to talk about the future of the Houthi movement given the current circumstances in Yemen. The facts on the ground are changing rapidly, making it difficult to predict the course of events and the future of the actors. Making things more difficult is the complexity of the landscape, the opposing agendas of internal and external actors, and the nature of the Houthi movement itself, which has mysterious objectives and organizational structure as well as limited experience and secret internal and external alliances. Accordingly, what can be said about the future of the Houthi movement cannot go much beyond theoretical opinions, whose conclusions could change as a result of events that are not taken into account. Therefore, this paper will develop scenarios that could benefit future studies where the level of certainty is very low. This approach gives us the ability to forecast the future with a high level of coherence within the prevailing conditions, despite some apparent contradictions.

Morocco's participation in the Saudi-led coalition was formed to confront the expansion of Houthi rebel control over the Yemeni state. This study gives an overview of the factors that led to the expansion of the geopolitical and geostrategic depth of the Gulf States to include a number of Arab countries, all the way to the Kingdom of Morocco. The paper discusses the gains Morocco made as a result of joining Operation Decisive Storm. Morocco faces similar challenges from extremist groups, making participation in the operation an opportunity it can benefit from later in the event it needs to tackle similar militias in the Sahara. In addition to the economic and political reasons for joining the coalition, the geostrategic shifts in the Arab region and the rise of the threat of extremist ideological forces in the region has prompted Morocco and the Gulf States to develop a new vision for relations on the basis of cross-border national security. The paper finally tackles the shift Morocco's participation has represented, examining King Mohammed VI's preference for more rapprochement with the European neighborhood.

The 2011 Arab uprisings sparked hopes for positive change in the regional politics of the Middle East. The uprisings not only challenged the authority of states at the domestic level but seemed poised to disrupt regional geopolitics and alter the position of the Middle East in the international system. With the outbreak of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, military interventions in Bahrain and Yemen, and the unprecedented proliferation of armed non- state actors in the region, the uprisings seem to drive important changes in the nature of the state and its regional and international role. Despite its artificial inception and its puzzling survival throughout the 20 th century, the Arab State faces challenges in the post- 2011 era and its vulnerabilities have been exposed. While the uprisings may have weakened Arab states, changes at regional and international levels created permissive conditions to challenge the regional state system. Hamas's 7 October 2023 operation and Israel's ensuing wars in the region have further exacerbated state erosion and reinvigorated post- 2011 regional dynamics. This paper examines how structural international and regional conditions have reshaped statehood and agency in the region post- 2011. It also explores how the responses of Arab states to international conditions and the regional reverberations of the uprisings have further generated disintegrative effects for the Arab state.

External influence has played a central role in the Yemeni conflict. Powers seeking to extend power and establish dominance have manipulated Yemen’s diversity as a way to gain influence. Other powers seem to be using Yemen as a way to step into regional power vacuums. At the same time, diplomatic activity has been used as a way to maintain interests and sustain polar uniqueness. Each of these areas of influence are key to understanding the current conflict and for determining a path ahead. This paper examines these avenues and specifically looks at key developments leading up to the current conflict. These include the six wars waged by Ali Abdullah Saleh against the Houthis, the political game shifts in Yemen, the weakening of the state and other factors that led to the take-over Yemen’s capital city of Sanaa.