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The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

The post-Cold War environment has produced a world distribution structure different from that of the system prevailing in the 1945-1991 period. Geographical regions of pivotal value have emerged as important arenas of competition among the great powers, each drawing strength from the prominent features of location and resources. Referencing these same features, this study examines the geopolitical importance of Arab and Islamic countries within the international system. It posits a set of factors to inform an understanding of the international system's evolving nature: energy, the distribution of power and hegemonies in the geopolitical spaces of Europe and Asia.

Why is the GCC, which is now in its fourth decade, still a weak defensive organization? This paper tries to explain the dilemmas of collective security in the Arab Gulf region. The paper first elucidates the concept of collective security, which forms the theoretical framework for this study. It then reviews the main sources of threat to Gulf security. It then offers a discussion of security dimensions and defense cooperative between the GCC states, and a detailed analysis of the dilemmas of collective security in the GCC, as well as of the features of the proposed collective security system.

How is International Relations (IR) taught in the Arab World? What happens to what was once labelled an 'American Social Science' when it enters classrooms in the Arab world and is taught in Arabic? Despite the predominance of Western approaches and theories on the teaching of IR in the Arab World, there is tension between the need to train students in the classical theories as a prerequisite for knowledge production, and the need to adapt them to various political, social, and economic contexts across the globe. This study examines the different approaches to how IR is taught in Arab universities, and how Western theories are considered critically by the teaching of alternative approaches. The paper argues that the different approaches to teaching IR are more versatile theoretically than the range of published papers in leading academic journals in the West. As such, they may prove to be the starting point for new forms of knowledge production that better reflect the realities of international relations in the Arab world.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

Iran, over the past four decades, lived through a state of continuous alert to defend itself against the threats surrounding it and targeting its national security. Over that period, Iran did not enjoy clear recognition of its legitimacy from the major powers, the United States in particular. This created ongoing anxiety and restricted Iran’s efforts of “preserving the regime”, which Ayatollah Khomeini made the highest duty. These circumstances had tangible effects on Iranian national security and its strategy. The article sees that the nuclear agreement might be the beginning of a new phase. Via the agreement, Iran feels it has gained the recognition of the international community, and acknowledgement of its demand for legitimacy. Most importantly for Iran, the agreement shifts it away from the obsession with security and stability, and encourages it to bring out the features of the “Iranian model” in the region. The paper also discusses the fears of neighboring states and Iran’s efforts to reassure them. The positions of the political currents and the power centers in Iran are also considered as well as their differences over the pluses and minuses of the agreement.

The paper provides indications and analysis of the positions of the most influential Shia powers and parties in Iraq after the fall of the predominantly Sunni city of Mosul and the rise of the Islamic State group in 2014. In addition to the Najaf-based supreme Shia religious authority led by ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Shia parties represented in government since 2003, the paper shed light on the increasingly powerful Iran-backed armed groups Popular Mobilization (Hashd Sha'abi) and how their appeal, visibility and influence had changed after the fall of Mosul. The question of the Iraqi national identity and how it interacts with the Shia identity is addressed in the paper in light of the discourse of the Shia powers and relations between Shia Iraqis and other communities.

This study attempts to determine the latest changes in the US-Saudi alliance and reflect on its destabilization. Specifically, it aims to determine whether the current crisis in US-Saudi relations might actually lead to a rift. Alternatively, the current events could be nothing but a temporary breakup depending on each country’s vision of its interests, after which relations could resume. The study reached some important results. It concluded, for example, that the speculation of a collapse of the US-Saudi alliance and its replacement with the US-Iranian alliance is farfetched and lacks depth. It is politically impossible and strategically inoperable for the US to side with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia amid the current polarization.

Interest Iranian foreign policy in Africa could be treat back to the sixties of the last twentieth century, when African states attained their independence.