Latest Articles

Scholars studying the Middle East often challenge the IR discipline's Eurocentric framings of the world by emphasizing the particularities of the Middle East, which defy and challenge the universality of Western-rooted IR theories. Social constructivism, focusing on agency and processes, has been regarded by many as an approach with the potential of taking into consideration specific historical, ideational, and cultural contexts in the Middle East region. Social constructivism, as developed by Alexander Wendt (1992 , 1994 , 1999), seems to lend itself especially well to adaptations to provide insights for the Middle East. This article revisits some aspects of Wendt's constructivism and explores its applicability in the Middle East. The article examines Wendt's cultures of anarchy to show how cooperative relations transform into conflict through processes of interaction. I examine how the Middle East provides both a potential and challenge to his argument by examining the case of Saudi relations with Hamas, with a particular focus on the episode of the 2009 Gaza war. The article examines the puzzle of how Saudi Arabia changed and evolved over the years from supporting Hamas and the Palestinian resistance to identifying it as an enemy, despite sharing pan-Islamism as a collective identity.

An analysis of the results of the 19th Israeli Knesset elections, held in January 2013, indicates a continuation of the political and social changes currently underway in Israeli politics, such as the decline of the major parties and the continuation of traditional voting patterns in Israel. On the other hand, new transformations have been noted, most importantly the dominance of the right on the Israeli political scene. The elections showed the lack of an alternative to the Likud Party. For the first time there was no other party to compete with it to form the government. This came in the context of the increasing strength of the new right in Israel and the decline in the camp of the leftist parties. The election results also showed for the first time the preponderance of the socio-economic factor in determining how to vote, whereas previously the political-security factor had been dominant in determining electoral behavior. This change led the Israeli middle classes to strongly back the Yesh Atid party, which placed the interests of the middle class at the center of its social discourse. Overall, the study makes clear that the analytic of left and right is inadequate for understanding voting patterns in Israeli elections.

Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

This study distinguishes between three Interrelated theoretical approaches prevalent in writings of researchers seeking to understand the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement, "Hamas". The first of these approaches examines the movement from the portal of ideology, stressing the importance of international and regional dimensions and the rise of political Islam after the "setback" (Naksa) of the 1967 Six Day War. The second approaches Hamas as representing a social movement seeking to revisit the historical narrative of Palestinian society. The third considers it to be the heir of the Palestinian national liberation movement, attributing its rise to transformations witnessed in Palestinian identity and the Palestinian community's definition of itself. Although the three readings do not contradict each other, a focus on one of them can lead to oversimplification or exaggeration: emphasis on the first approach is at risk of overlooking transformations in the movement in its later stages and a marginalization at the micro level of local dimensions; emphasis on the second approach can result in the overestimation of the effectiveness of collective action; exaggerated emphasis on the third approach deprives social actors of their effectiveness. Hence this study proposes situating Hamas in the intersection of these three approaches.

Through a critical review, this paper examines the most important issues raised during the political forum for "The Washington Institute," a forum devoted to the discussion of US policies in the Middle East. This is based in a belief of the importance of critical interaction with the outcomes of policy centers in the United States, given the global significance of these centers in terms of impact on American foreign policy making or critical discussions aimed at understanding what the Washington institute promotes. A critical view is needed in particular around the Zionist and Israeli interests of the institute. The paper also focusses on the objectives of the political forum, and a call for redefining the allies of the US in the region and the establishment of a strategic constellation of allies that include Israel and other Arab countries.​

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

The purpose of this paper is to document Qatar's recent contribution of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. We consider Qatar as an example of a mini state that relies on its wealth and soft power to further its interests in the Middle East and support a beleaguered Arab-Muslim state. The paper carries out analysis of Arabic newspapers and other documentary evidence to contextualize and estimate Qatar's financial contribution from 2010 to 2016. Contextualizing Qatar's aid necessitates considering Israel's military control of the Palestinian Territories, and its ability through hard power to regulate the inflow of aid to Palestine. The paper concludes by calling for adopting the political economy perspective in dealing with humanitarian aid.

This study attempts to determine the latest changes in the US-Saudi alliance and reflect on its destabilization. Specifically, it aims to determine whether the current crisis in US-Saudi relations might actually lead to a rift. Alternatively, the current events could be nothing but a temporary breakup depending on each country’s vision of its interests, after which relations could resume. The study reached some important results. It concluded, for example, that the speculation of a collapse of the US-Saudi alliance and its replacement with the US-Iranian alliance is farfetched and lacks depth. It is politically impossible and strategically inoperable for the US to side with Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia amid the current polarization.

This study aims to define the interests and goals of the United States in the Arab region by answering two main questions: how does the Obama administration differ from its predecessors in view of its promises of change, particularly following the tragic transformations raging in the Arab region at present? And to what extent does the strategy of this administration reflect its public diplomacy regarding democracy, freedom, and justice in the region? The study explains how Obama raised the ceiling of expectations when he did not limit his promises to a change in American policy only, but included putting an end to the mentality that had pushed the United States into war. Despite the difference in style and method between the Obama and Bush Junior administrations, the overall goals and the regional strategy can be summarized in terms of three key interests: the priority of ensuring free access to energy supplies in the region; maintaining American supremacy over all other global powers; and the containment of all Arab objections to ensure the dominance of the US strategic agenda in the Arab region, including the guarantee of Israel's security.

Since the time of President Thomas Jefferson, and on through the presidents of the 20th century, the United States has talked about itself as the propagator, protector, and defender of democracy around the world. Yet America has never showed any qualms of forming military and political alliances with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. The US justifies these international alliances on the basis that “not all dictatorships in the world are enemies of the United States, but all the United States’ enemies are dictatorships.” The US therefore adopted a two-track diplomacy: while working to spread democracy (directly or by means of international organizations and NGOs) the US has no issue in supporting autocratic governments when its interests are involved. How did US policy apply to the democratic transformation in the former Eastern bloc states in Europe on the eve of the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequently, when American values and interests went hand in hand, and how did it then apply to the Arab Spring of 2011, when US values and interests were congruent in some cases and out of sync in others, according to the situation in each country and its strategic importance from America’s perspective? What are the results of these policies and what differences emerge from such a comparison of the Arab and East Europe cases.