Latest Articles

This study explores the concept of "deep cultural genocide" in the context of the Israeli war on Gaza in 2023 - 2024. It seeks to expand this concept to encompass tangible cultural genocide, which includes the systematic destruction or appropriation of heritage and cultural symbols, the erasure of identity, and dehistoricization. In addition to the deep cultural genocide aimed at depriving one party in the conflict of narrating events and presenting its narrative to the world, The study examines how this narrative facilitated the genocide, attempted to justify it, and contributed to the prolonged silence surrounding its continuation for many months.Utilizing a critical perspective grounded in cultural and media studies, the study incorporates the concepts of "c ultivation," "c ultural bias," and "m anufacturing consent." The findings reveal that during this war on Gaza, Israel transitioned from practicing slow cultural genocide, a method driven by colonial powers for over a century, to executing a "deep cultural genocide." This approach not only involved the systematic and direct destruction of Palestinian heritage and culture but also extended to efforts to extinguish the Palestinian narrative and prevent its dissemination to a global audience.

​Many analysts and observers believe the opposition media played a critical role in ousting Morsi through their printed and television outlets, which reported against him for a whole year. This paper examines Egyptian media’s policies, starting from Morsi’s becoming president at the end of June 2012 and extending to the stage following his ouster until now. The paper lists the main strategies adopted by the media and lays out models of Egyptian media’s international coverage. It also explores the motives behind the work of some media outlets and their common traits and tries to explain why the media adopted this type of discourse. The paper also highlights the forms of provocation practiced by several Egyptian media outlets against the coup opponents and detects several rumors spread by the media and their source.

This study explores the use of sports as a diplomatic soft power tool employed by states to achieve foreign policy objectives. It adopts a constructivist framework that highlights the role of symbolic factors in shaping state behaviour. Focusing on Qatar, as a small state lacking traditional power resources, the study examines how its leadership turned to alternative tools, notably sports, as a strategic means of influence. Qatari sports diplomacy relies on four main pillars: investing in global sports clubs, developing infrastructure and hosting major sporting events, investing in sports media, and supporting local sports. This strategic use of sport has contributed to redefining Qatar's role and enhancing its international standing, enabling it to exercise political and economic influence and to support the diversification of its national economy.

This article traces the different paths taken by constructivism in International Relations, from its emergence as a critical social theory in the 1980 s, in response to the third debate between positivist rationalists and post-positivist reflectivists, to Alexander Wendt's project to seize a middle ground and to bridge the rationalist–reflectivist epistemological gap. The article, then, examines the intra-debates among conventional and critical constructivists on Went's project, as well as the rise of the new constructivism after Wendt left the constructivist research program. The article explores the Wendtian project's epistemological tensions and demonstrates how such tensions led to a plurality within constructivism: modernist conventional and postmodernist critical (reflectivist). It highlights that Wendt's leaving constructivism and his shift to a quantum approach have not caused constructivism to decline, but instead, it continued to thrive through the efforts of a new generation of constructivists. The article argues that three main developments in International Relations over the past twenty years have contributed to its ongoing thriving: the decline of epistemological polarization among IR theories; the rise of critical realism as a philosophy of science in International Relations, and the emergence of analytical eclecticism.

This paper applies the categorization of welfare state systems set out by Esping-Andersen in 1990 to the welfare state in Egypt. It analyzes the relationships between state, market, and society over the 10 years from 1995 to 2005, which were marked by a shift to a market economy and a confrontation with the historical legacy of the state’s social role. The best description for the current welfare state in Egypt is “conservative/unorganized” in that social security entitlements are limited to work in the formal sector, which makes the family, religious institutions, and patronage networks take on important roles in meeting the social needs of the large informal sector. Additionally, the study proposes some modifications to the Esping-Andersen categorization with the aim of understanding welfare programs in developing countries. When analyzing welfare systems in general, particularly in the developing countries, it is necessary to take into account methodologically aspects of mismanagement, considerations of quality, the gap between stated aims and their implementation, the disparity resulting from differences between countryside and city and between the sexes, and the role of the informal sector.

​According to Jonathan Grix and Fiona Carmichael, when implementing national sport policies, one of the governments' main objectives is to invest funds into gaining international prestige. Although these national sport policies' objectives have also been identified by several other leading scholars in sport governance, research proposing a measurement of these policies' success or failure remains scarce. In fact, to evaluate if countries have reached international prestige through sports, researchers tend to generally refer to the Olympic Medal Table, while the newly created soft power indicators, the "Soft Power 30", "Soft Power Index" and "Global Soft Power Index" have not managed to use appropriate sport rankings to measure countries' capacities to use sport as an instrument of soft power. The objective of this paper is to identify the inaccuracies of these commonly used indices and propose a new ranking that would evaluate whether the national sport policies implemented by governments have succeeded in developing soft power.

The Arab region offers a rich ground for testing constructivist assumptions, and moving beyond both realism that focuses on material power and liberalism promises linear progress. If international politics is shaped by shared intersubjective meanings, the region's interplay of history, identity, religion, culture, and interests makes it ideal for developing and challenging constructivist approaches.

This article discusses the challenges facing the government of Haider al-Abadi in Iraq, and outlines what ought to be expected in the coming stage, particularly after the fall of Mosul to ISIL. The paper reviews the failure of the regime post 2002 to insure equal participation of all segments of Iraq in the institution of power following the sectarian polices adopted by Nouri al-Maliki who exercised control over all the levers of the political regime and the public political institutions, and systematically harassed other politicians and parties – Sunnis in particular. The paper also reviews the American position, the intervention of the international coalition, and the establishment of the national guard. It looks at the other challenges facing the effort to keep Iraq together and help it emerge from its problems, including the threat of ISIL, sectarian division, the security situation, and the economy. The paper also reviews the regional overlap with the Iraqi situation, particularly the Iranian aspect, and what is transpiring as a new regional equation.

ﺗﺒﻨ ﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻮن اوروﺑﻴﻮن واﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﻮن واÈ ﻋﻼم واﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، ﺑﺤﻤﺎسٍ، ﺳﻨﺔ 2011، ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد ا وروﺑﻲ ﺑﺪﻋﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻮّل اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺑﺴﺨﺎء. وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻟﻢ ﻳﺮقَاوروﺑﻴﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى وﻋﻮدﻫﻢ؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ودوﻟﻪ اﻋﻀﺎء، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺤﺮب اﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان، واﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻓﻲ أﺧﺮى، إﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻔﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ ﻋﻮارض ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات. وﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﺆﺛ ﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، أﺛ ﺮت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ. ﺗﺤﻠﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﻨﺎﻫﺞ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ "اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ"، وأدواﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ، وأوﻟﻮﻳﺎﺗﻪ، وﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪى اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اورﺑﻲ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﻮﻧﺲ. In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. Te EU pledged to generously support transformation processes initiated in the region. Yet, Europeans – as other third parties – have not lived up to their promises. Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings turning into violence and civil war in some countries and authoritarian restoration in others, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Indeed, rather than the EU impacting on the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring, these dynamics have strongly impacted on Europe. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper analyzes the EU's approaches, instruments and priorities – and how the latter have changed over the course of the last years.

Where the Cold War crises took place in the context of a bilateral international system represented by the Western and Soviet entities, the recent Ukrainian crisis is played out on an international stage where the US remains the world’s unipolar power. This paper discusses the major differences between these contexts with the aim of better understanding the possible outcomes and ramifications of the crisis. Such an understanding seems vital, for if the Ukrainian crisis continues without reaching a political or diplomatic solution, the cost will be higher for Russia and EU countries than it will be for the United States. The paper shows how European countries will pay a higher price for the crisis, compared with others in the region with different foreign policy priorities due to the EU’s current political and economic interests that tie it to Russia.