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The failure of the 15th of July 2016 military coup attempt in Turkey will remain an exceptional landmark in Turkey’s modern history, as well as in the political legacy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Declaring the state of emergency, arresting thousands of individuals, temporarily dismissing tens of thousands of governmental employees for investigation, shutting down a number of universities and Islamic endowments under the pretext of fighting the “parallel state”, besides calling for the reconstruction of the military establishment, necessitates analyzing the possible repercussions of this coup attempt on Turkish political life. The paper will address this coup’s consequences by discussing the following: battling the “parallel state”, reconstructing the military establishment, writing a new constitution, and predicting possible turns in Turkish foreign policy.

Examining the Egypt's military coup against an elected president on July 3 2013, this paper compares these summer events with similar experiences of countries that were also in the early stages of democratic development, including Venezuela in 2002 and Algeria in 1992. It looks in particular at the relationships between the "deep state," the "street," and the media in shaping the course of a coup's aftermath. In Egypt, the paper shows, it was the alliance liberal and secular forces with private media companies as well as military institution's reliance on its "deep state" network, which played a central role in mobilizing the street against the elected president Mohamed Morsi. This led to a counterrevolution that brought the tyrannical state and its figures back to power. Reading into the post-coup models Egypt's internal circumstances, regional situation, and the nature of the organization itself (different in many respects from the nature of the Islamist political movement that went through the same experience in Algeria), the paper draws out possible scenarios for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

This study adopts a comparative approach to investigate the impact of the reciprocal fears of internal and external parties on the stances of key actors during the 2011 transitions. Apparently, the uncertainty that accompanies any democratic elections has not been a local factor in the Arab cases because regional and international forces have an interest in hindering democracy, being a potential threat to the status quo. The study examines four interrelated problems related to external factors. It concludes that the external factors that have hindered democracy in non-Arab cases were not inevitable because addressing them seems to have been related to changes in the international system and the emergence of domestic democratic blocs that are able to exert pressure on external forces and get them to change their positions.

The struggle for political legitimacy has been central to political polarization in Egypt since the 2013 coup. Given the regime's pronounced authoritarian features, the traditional form of legal electoral legitimacy proved insufficient and ineffective. As a result, the regime adopted alternative strategies to reinforce its political legitimacy. Drawing on theories of political legitimacy and literature on citizenship in authoritarian regimes, this study explores the measures and practices implemented by the July 2013 regime to achieve legitimacy across its three dimensions: the system's effectiveness and competence, citizens' beliefs in its legitimacy, and their behaviours that signal recognition.

This study reads the performance of Egyptian political forces from the time of Mohamed Morsi’s election as president of the republic to the coup against him on July 3, 2013. In its first section, the study concludes that the behavior of all political actors can be understood as a search for allies from within the old regime’s centers of power; this despite the fact that these forces were the targets of the January 25 Revolution. Nonetheless, political parties seek out old guard forces hoping they will provide leverage for a position of power. This reality allowed the old regime – with its enormous capabilities—to rejoin the map of political forces instead of being held accountable. In its second section, the study tries to read the map of the protest movement on June 30, comparing this new map with one of the nation’s politics during the crisis of the constitutional declaration in November 2012. It concludes that the most important development in the nation’s political sphere has been the ability of the “deep state” to learn the skills of popular mobilization in the street. This came after it had failed to do so in the previous 36 months. Using its connections with a wide spectrum of social groups through networks of patronage and influence, which it had not thought of using in the spectacular “battle of the squares,” the “deep state” was able to become an active and influential political player capable of taking matters back to square one.

​Qatari foreign policy presents a challenge for students of international relations. Whereas major theories within the field tend to privilege structural factors in explaining the action of states, and particularly small states, in the case of Qatar, the quality of leadership and the strategies that leadership employs to navigate through the structural constraints—primarily geography—are equally important. One of the main findings of this paper is that the strategies adopted by the Qatari elite since 1995 did alleviate many of the structural constraints which the country would otherwise have faced. Moreover, during the short-lived Arab Spring of 2011-2013, Qatar tried to reshape the political landscape in the Middle East to its favor, challenging the two regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Egypt and Syria respectively. Yet, the paper concludes, geopolitical factors and the relative capabilities of states remain instrumental in assuring a state’s sustained capacity to continue playing a key role. This is particularly true in a region where elite thinking continues to be defined by realpolitik.

ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف أﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻮز/ ﻳﻮﻟﻴﻮ 2013. وﺗﺨﺘﺒﺮ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺼﺮي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﻬﺎ، وﺗﺠﺎدل ﺑﺄﻧ ﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻀﻴﻴﻖ واﻟﻘﻤﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻤﺎرﺳﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﻘﻮى واﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ، ﻓﺈن ﺛﻤﺔ أﺷﻜﺎﻟ ﺎ وأﻧﻤﺎﻃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ واﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻇﻬﺮت ﺧﻼل اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻘﻤﻌﻴﺔ. وﻗﺪ راوﺣﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻧﻤﺎط وا ﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻴﻦ ﺗﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺳﻠﻤﻴﺔ وأﺧﺮى ﻋﻨﻴﻔﺔ، ﻛﻤﺎ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ واﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ وﺣﻘﻮﻗﻴﺔ. ﻟﺬا ﺗﺤﺎول اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻤﻊ وأﺷﻜﺎل اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ودرﺟﺎﺗﻪ، وﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﻤﻊ ﻳﺆدي إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﻞ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج أم زﻳﺎدﺗﻪ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪه، ﺑﻄﺮق وأﺳﺎﻟﻴﺐ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻧﻘﻼب 2013، اﻟﺘﻌﺒﺌﺔ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ، اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ، ﻣﺼﺮ. This study explores political mobilization in Egypt after the coup of July 3, 2013, and the way in which regime oppression shaped the responses of political forces within the country. The author argues that novel and varied forms of political mobilization have emerged in Egypt in the past few years in spite of regime oppression. The nature of the response was also dictated on the relevant group’s focus. This paper shall attempt to unravel the dialectical relationship between state repression and political dissent in Egypt, seeking to determine the ways in which state repression shapes the form and intensity of political dissent

What motivates an authoritarian system, or more precisely, its leadership, which tailors legislation to its needs, violates it at will, usurps powers and combines them as it wishes, to support the existence of a seemingly "formal" independent judiciary? Moreover, how does it allow this judiciary to challenge it by limiting its authorities and narrowing its interests? The study revisits this perennial yet contemporary question, employing the Palestinian experience as a case study. It adopts a comprehensive analytical approach, examining the orientations of the Palestinian Constitutional Judiciary (PCJ), represented by the Supreme Constitutional Court and its predecessor, the Supreme Court as a temporary constitutional court, over two decades (2002 - 2022). The study originated from the assumption that the PCJ undertakes a "dual function" akin to experiences observed in authoritarian regimes, where there is a propensity for the existence of a judiciary that allows the sacrifice of some of its non-essential interests. This sacrifice is made in exchange for its utilization in legitimizing the regime and/or reassuring investors and/or controlling the administrative apparatus. However, the study concluded that the sole central and substantive interest is the support of the alleged legitimacy of the regime, and there is no corresponding sacrifice of non- essential interests. Instead, there is an abandonment of human rights.

This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.