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The Assad regime was quick to accept the terms of a Russian proposal to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons following a chemical weapons attack on civilians under siege in East and West Ghouta. Within days of the attack on August 21, 2013 the regime’s chemical weapons stockpile was made available to international observers, with the Syrian regime even making an application to join the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 20 of the same year—Damascus had previously insisted that Israel join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before it signed up to the CWC. This paper seeks to understand (the possible) increased acceptance of Bashar Al Assad by the global media, which might presage a rehabilitation of his image, pending his presentation on the world stage as a legitimate head of state for Syria in the wake of the chemical weapons deal his country has struck.

Israel believes the US-Russian agreement to disarm Syria of its chemical weapons holds several opportunities and risks. In terms of opportunities, Israel thinks the agreement will save it from the dangers of chemical weapons and will eliminate the justifications for launching a US military campaign on Syria. Such a campaign could tip the balance of power in favor of the rebels in a way that might lead to the fall of the regime and the rise of jihadi groups, which is not in Israel’s interest. Israel is also afraid that the regime might succeed, with Russian support, in evading its commitment to the agreement. The risk factors would then persist and threaten its internal front. At the same time, there is a clear discordance in the Israeli stances vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Russian role in the region. This paper aims at exploring the extent to which the US-Russian agreement caters to Israel’s interests in Syria, and examines the repercussions of the agreement on the US and its deterrence power and their impact on Israel’s national security. The paper also explores the significance of the decisive Russian role in reaching an agreement.

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.

A chemical weapons attack by the Syrian regime on August 21, 2013, led to a massacre of civilians in the towns of East Ghouta and West Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus and marked a turning point in the Syrian conflict. US President Barack Obama had previously undertaken to respond militarily if such an attack took place, provided that Congress would support such a decision. Such a direct US military intervention remained likely despite opposition among the American public and within Congress itself, up to and until a Russian proposal, quickly accepted by the Assad regime in Damascus, which would place all of Syria’s chemical weapons under international supervision before they were destroyed by Moscow. This paper examines how the Obama White House dealt with the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. The paper also deals with declining international interest in a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis, with the world community now shifting its focus from punishing the Assad regime to accepting the destruction of those weapons.

The Strategic Studies Unit Conference of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies held a symposium on August 29, 2022, entitled "Ukraine: Conventional and Unconventional Military Developments and Foreign Fighters", attended by three researchers specialising in security and strategic studies, Omar Ashour, director of the Strategic Studies Unit and head of the Critical Security Studies Graduate Programme (MCSS) at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Kacper Edward Rekawe, postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo, and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon are chemical weapons advisers to NGOs working in Syria and Iraq. He is a former commanding officer of the UK Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Regiment and NATO's Rapid Reaction CBRN Battalion. It was chaired by Sidahmed Goudjili, Assistant Professor in Critical Security Studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies.

This article traces the different paths taken by constructivism in International Relations, from its emergence as a critical social theory in the 1980 s, in response to the third debate between positivist rationalists and post-positivist reflectivists, to Alexander Wendt's project to seize a middle ground and to bridge the rationalist–reflectivist epistemological gap. The article, then, examines the intra-debates among conventional and critical constructivists on Went's project, as well as the rise of the new constructivism after Wendt left the constructivist research program. The article explores the Wendtian project's epistemological tensions and demonstrates how such tensions led to a plurality within constructivism: modernist conventional and postmodernist critical (reflectivist). It highlights that Wendt's leaving constructivism and his shift to a quantum approach have not caused constructivism to decline, but instead, it continued to thrive through the efforts of a new generation of constructivists. The article argues that three main developments in International Relations over the past twenty years have contributed to its ongoing thriving: the decline of epistemological polarization among IR theories; the rise of critical realism as a philosophy of science in International Relations, and the emergence of analytical eclecticism.

This paper attempts to study a wider trend of jihadist groups with a globalist outlook, a phenomenon which was not entirely clearly understood when the Syrian revolution broke out. Since only the broad outlines of this trend are apparent, leaving many of the details as yet unclear, the author shall attempt to illuminate the environment in which these groups operate. Specifically, the paper examines “Nusra Front” (known in full as the “Nusra” or “Salvation” Front for the People of Syria). The paper follows the foundation of the group and the circumstances which allowed it to flourish and spread across Syria through to the internal divisions which led to its fragmentation before it made way for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The conclusion of this paper surveys some of the immediate and secondary consequences of the spread of both of these groups.

Increasing numbers of Syrians have sought refuge in Europe in previous months. The United Nations estimates that by the end of 2015, the number of Syrian refugees to have arrived in Europe will have reached 850,000. Factors contributing to the accelerating pace of Syrians seeking refuge in Europe include the militarization of the Syrian revolution and the regime’s collective punishment of communities living outside of its control. The Assad regime’s indiscriminate shelling of the of civilians living in zones under opposition control and the opposition’s inability to administer those zones have exacerbated these processes.

The major turning points of the Syrian revolution, beginning with the earliest public demonstrations on March 15, 2011, are here examined. The author revisits speeches made by President Bashar Al Assad in the early days of the uprising, in which he was quoted as discounting the likelihood of a revolution affecting Syria the way it did other Arab countries on the grounds that his government’s policies were in line with public sentiment. The paper then revisits the regime’s excessively violent repression of the first peaceful protests, which led to the militarization of the revolution. The author holds the international community, including the Arab League and the United Nations culpable for ensuing large scale slaughter of Syrian civilians, standing idly by even as it became apparent that Assad was mercilessly killing his own people. Meanwhile, Syria has become the site for a number of world and regional powers—including the United States, the United Kingdom, France Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, China, Iran and Russia—to advance their fundamentally incompatible policies. As a consequence of these competing foreign interventions, the author contends that the return of normalcy in Syria will be impossible for the foreseeable future.