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This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

Today, India is actively engaged in projecting its influence beyond its geographic proximity. It has a proactive policy based on national interests and driven by its growing needs, particularly for energy imports, and an ambition to achieve a position of global prominence. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is of great geopolitical importance to India's strategy because of its geographic proximity, the abundance of energy resources, the great financial assets, and as the place with the largest Indian immigrant community. Nevertheless, many regional contenders may challenge India's interests in the region. This article discusses the geopolitical and economic importance of the GCC states and their current position in India's strategy. It explores the driving forces behind novel strategic partnerships between them. It also analyses how third-party relations with the GCC states or India may affect their relationships, such as China, Pakistan, and Iran. It also focuses on the new containment policy of India and China and their geopolitical contest over the Gulf and the GCC's hydrocarbon and financial assets.

India adopts a cautious policy towards the GCC states during the emergence of differences between them, such as the Gulf crisis of 2017 - 2021. This stems from many considerations: First, the principle of non-alignment. Despite Narendra Modi's government focus on proactive diplomacy and engagement abroad, it has reverted to the principle of non-alignment and neutrality in dealing with the crisis. Second, the special relationship with the GCC states. Given the depth of historical interdependence, geographic proximity and intertwining of economic interests, these states are India's most important trading partner and are home to the largest overseas Indian community. Third, the roles of other countries. Because the competing countries such as China and Pakistan have remained neutral, this has encouraged India not to take an active role in solving the conflict. United States' key role in mediation encouraged New Delhi to remain neutral, taking advantage of Washington's efforts and its influence in securing energy routes. Nevertheless, India has taken an active role in providing Qatar with essential needs and food products during the crisis.

This study examines the role of identity, ideas, norms, and interests in shaping the Arab regional order across different historical periods, building on Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach. It critically evaluates both the explanatory power and inherent constraints of this approach in explaining regional dynamics within the Arab region. The study focuses on pivotal junctures linked to major events such as the Baghdad Pact (1955), the 1967 defeat, the Gulf War (1990), the Iraq invasion (2003), and the Arab Spring (2011). It demonstrates how these events reshaped regional identities through competing narratives and dominant dichotomies, where actors' legitimacy depended on their ability to impose narratives and redefine core issues. The study concludes that identity politics and normative frameworks played a central role in shaping regional policies and dynamics. Regional conflicts mainly manifested as struggles over ideational factors and positional roles rather than crude power maximization. Although constructivism offers valuable insights into how identity shapes regional interactions, its explanatory scope remains partial. As with all IR theoretical perspectives, it emphasizes certain dimensions while neglecting others.

اﺗﺴﻤﺖ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ازﻣﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وا ﻣﺎرات واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪوء واﻟﺜﻘﺔ واﻻﺗﺰان. وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺐ أن ﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻘﻄﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ا زﻣﺔ، ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﺠﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻣﺮورًا ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺮﻣﺠﺔ، ﻣﻦ دون اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ "ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ". وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر ﻗﺪ ﺧﻄﻄﺖ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ا زﻣﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﻨﺢ اﻟﻈﻼم، ﻓﺠﺮ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮب "اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﻊ واﻟﺼﺪﻣﺔ" اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻓﺈن ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻣﺘﺼﺎص "اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ اوﻟﻰ"، ﺑﻼ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺄة. وﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ داء اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ وردة ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ إزاء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﻨﻌﻄﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ ازﻣﺔ، ﻳُﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗ ﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﻬﺪوء، واﻟﺜﻘﺔ، واﻻﺗﺰان، اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺴﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ اداء اﻟﻘﻄﺮي، وﻫﺬه اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻫﻲ: ﺳﻘﻮط ﻋﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﺟﺄة، وﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ "اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ"، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ، وارﺗﺒﺎك اﻟﺨﺼﻢ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴّﺔ، اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ، اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ. Since the outbreak of the crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on 24 May 2017, Qatar's diplomacy has been characterised by calm, confidence and balance. The observer can't understand the diplomatic approach of Qatar in dealing with all stages of the crisis - from explosion to siege, through state-orchestrated media campaigns - without knowing the "behind the scenes" facts. Blockading countries planned to blow the crisis up under the cover of darkness, before the dawn of May 24. But Qatar was, unsurprisingly, able to absorb the "shock and awe" first strike. Five factors characterise the country's diplomatic performance as it has reacted to developments and turning points in the crisis: The failure of the 'element of surprise', years of building Qatar's "nation brand", Qatar's arsenal of "soft power", international alliances, and the opponents' quandary.

This study explores the origins of Qatari-US relations, the foundations on which they are based, and the rules that govern them. It begins by examining relations between the two countries from the 1970s up until the Trump era. The paper finds that Qatar's need for US security assurances did not prevent it from adopting independent policies that occasionally contradicted US strategy. Accordingly, the Qatari-US relations have been upended, and exposed to crises due to diverging interests, concerns and challenges. While Qatar has embraced a foreign policy independent of Washington, it has also tried not to alienate it and has established itself as an asset for the US, both in terms of the military facilities it provides and the unique role it plays through maintaining ties with parties that the US cannot communicate with directly. Mutual dependency has enabled Qatari-US relations to overcome all the challenges they have faced over the past three decades, including those that emerged under the Trump administration.

This paper adopts the assumption that the series of foreign interventions which served to transform the Syrian crisis from a domestic revolution into a regionalized, and later globalized, conflict were not the result of factors intrinsic to the revolution itself, but rather the consequences of dramatic changes sweeping across the entire Middle East following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The fallout from 2003 included the collapse of the former tripartite of Arab regional powers: Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. For the first time, the non-Arab regional powers of Turkey and Iran came to be directly involved in intra-Arab affairs. The latter effectively had an overland border tying it to Syria's Mediterranean coast once the US withdrew the bulk of its military forces from Iraq in 2011. While the Syrian regime had worked to strengthen its ties to both Ankara and Tehran in the wake of its losses following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Syria would fall victim to regional power politics between its two regional neighbors. Once the Syrian revolution was militarized, in response to the Damascus regime's iron-fisted approach to peaceful popular protests, Turkish-Iranian rivalry over the future of Syria quickly became bloody. In an attempt to limit the extent of influence not only by Turkey but also its ally Iran, the Syrian regime resorted to seeking out additional foreign support, latterly from Russia.

​This paper agrues that although the Arab Gulf is strategically located and of economic importance to China, the Gulf states did not fall along the original routes demarcated by the Belt and Road initiative roadmap. Nevertheless, both China and these states have begun to engage with the initiative and its projects by signing strategic partnerships, and to enmesh these projects with perspectives on national development in the Gulf. This has unsettled the United States and its allies, some of whom have begun to view this expansion as a serious challenge. As a result, there has been an attempt to impede the initiative's projects through debt-trap debate, geopolitical alliances, and putting forth alternative economic proposals. This study argues that the Gulf is of great concern to China and the requirements of the Belt and Road initiative, identifying where the Arab Gulf states are located on the initiative map and illustrating the way in which each state has gradually become involved in associated projects. It considers Western mechanisms and alternative projects in response to respond to and impede the initiative and the degree to which these mechanisms may apply to the Gulf states. The paper presents deductive observations as to China's likely approach in the event that the initiative is obstructed and its interests undermined. Will it modify its foreign strategy – and will this impact the Gulf?

Discussions regarding the relative success of Tunisia's democratic transition, argues Ladrissi, remain premature. His paper examines the extent to which particular Tunisian specificities could explain the relative success of Tunisia to date when compared to other Arab Spring states: the role of women in society; the legacy of founding president Bourguiba; and the role of Tunisian civil society. The paper asks if Tunisia will ultimately succeed in sowing the seeds of a permanent and lasting democracy. It sets out from the assumption that a functioning democratic system is predicated on three main factors: political dialogue; social homogeneity; and an organic state. Later, the author moves on to examine three distinct, if seemingly interdependent, aspects of transitional justice: the political responsibility of the previous political leadership; the criminal liability of those leaders for violations of human rights; and responsibility in questions of bribery and corruption. Finally, the paper summarizes three major threats to the Tunisian democratic experiment: the country's economic crisis, the weakening of the Tunisian state and terrorism.