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In an effort to understand the characteristics of "virtual communities" and specifically "information societies," this study attempts to test the argument that virtual communities, with their networked structure, pose a challenge (or represent an alternative) to traditional hierarchical structures, due to the former's ability to self-organize, and settle their internal disputes without the need for authoritative intervention. The study uses the case study approach, applied to 3 Wikipedia's edit wars. The chosen cases are related to a number of Middle East informational crises. The study concludes that mechanisms of virtual societies (e.g. self-organization) can work efficiently in cases of limited disputes, but in cases of sharp disagreements, traditional (hierarchical) mechanisms that include authoritative intervention and exercising some form of power, in a "top-down" approach, remain essential for conflict resolution. This implies that the factor of "authority" remains significant even in the context of virtual communities.

ﺗﺪﻋﻲ اﻟﺮواﻳﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ أن ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967 اﻧﺪﻟﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ وﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺨﻄﻂ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺳﻠﻔ ﺎ، وﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮة اﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺻﺪر ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺒﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ وﻣﺬﻛﺮات ودراﺳﺎت ووﺛﺎﺋﻖ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ؛ ﺗﺮﺳﻢ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﻨﺎﻗﻀﺔ ﺗﻤﺎﻣًﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻻدﻋﺎء. ﺗﻌﺎﻟﺞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ ﻓﻲ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻗﺮارات اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ، وﻫﻲ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﻮﻟﺔ رﺳﻤﻴًﺎ وﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴًﺎ اﺗﺨﺎذَ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب، ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ودورﻫﺎ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻄ ﺎ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪًا؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺳﻌﺖ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻟﺨﻠﻖ اﻟﻔﺮﺻﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﺸﻦ اﻟﺤﺮب ورﻓﻀﺖ أي ﺣﻞ ﺳﻠﻤﻲ ﻟÑزﻣﺔ، واﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻻﺗﺨﺎذ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺮار. وﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ، واﻟﺨﻄﻂ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺿﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ارﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻐﺮض ﺗﻮﺳﻴﻊ ﺣﺪود إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967، إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﻔﻲ إﺷﻜﻮل. Te official Israeli narrative of the June 1967 War depicts the country as having been dragged unwillingly into a conflict for which it had not planned. A close inspection of a number of detailed sources, scattered across a variety of published Hebrew materials, paint a picture entirely at odds with such a claim however. In this paper, the author addresses the Israeli decision to go to war in June 1967 by examining the steps taken by the Israeli government—legally, the only body mandated to declare war. Te author also examines the developments in the stance taken by the Israeli military command, which was instrumental in the decision to go to war. At the time, the Israeli military worked to create the right opportunity to declare war, refusing to accept any attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict and coerced the government into war through a variety of means.

This study deals with the war of aggression launched by Israel against the Gaza Strip at dawn on July 8, 2014. The war lasted for 50 days, during which the Israeli army committed a series of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Palestinian civilians, killing around 2,150 people and injuring 10,870. Thousands of homes were destroyed and around 400,000 Palestinians were made homeless. The paper gives an overview of the background to the assault, its stated and unstated goals, and the means adopted by Israel to achieve these goals, which basically meant the commission of successive massacres against Palestinian civilians. The paper considers the decision making process in the cabinet committee for security affairs (the Israeli security cabinet) and the debates and disagreements that occurred concerning the war aims and the means to achieve them. It also casts light on Israel’s fears concerning the formation of an international commission of inquiry, and on the economic losses to Israel caused by the war. Finally, it looks at the effect of the war for the future of Benjamin Netanyahu on the Israeli political party map.

The Islamic Republic's foreign policy, grounded in a revolutionary commitment to Shi ʿ i transnationalism, has long been viewed as a central mechanism for securing Iran's regional influence and post-revolutionary identity. Yet recent developments, most notably the June 2025 war with Israel, raise critical questions about the sustainability of this approach. While much scholarship has explored Iran's identity-driven foreign policy, less attention has been paid to the chronic contradictions it generates within Iran's ontological security framework, or how these contradictions both shape and constrain Iran's regional conduct. This study approaches the problem by theorising Iran's predicament as an ontological trap, a condition in which identity-affirming foreign policy routines produce chronic insecurity rather than stabilisation. It introduces the concept of a security dilemma of influence to explain how transnational networks (once strategic assets) now provoke nationalist contestation and narrative fatigue in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

This study discusses Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Persian Gulf, focusing on political, economic, strategic, historical, and religious dimensions. It details the escalation of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran since 1979 up until 2019, before delving into the agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two countries in March 2023. The study concludes that countries in the international system tend to maximize their capabilities and enhance their power; which sometimes leads to escalation in hostilities and the pursuit of an arms race. Iran's security strategy also includes enhancing its power and capabilities in pursuit of regional hegemony. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its greatest security threat, whereby Iran poses multiple air, sea, and cyber security challenges to the Kingdom.​

The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

This article deals with the post-2003 consociationalist experiment in Iraq. It examines the reasons why this experiment has failed in producing a reasonably coherent governing formula. It argues that, because of their emphasis on identity politics and not on making mutual concessions in the interest of serious statebuilding, the main players in this experiment (Shia, Sunni and Kurdish political elites) failed to appreciate the complexity of the consociationalist arrangement, let alone use it for public interest. The article focuses on the central role that the Shia Islamist parties played in making this failure happen, highlighting, as reasons, their insistence on an essentially sectarian rhetoric and their attempt to enforce it as a national identity. The article finally proposes a different rhetoric that can accommodate Iraq's ethnic and religious diversity.

The June, 1967 War was a turning point in the modern history not only of Palestine and the Zionist state but also the wider region. The defeat of the Arab armies was a pivotal moment for the modern and contemporary histories of the Arab world, and has consequences which continue to reverberate today. That fact remains unchanged despite attempts by Arab governments to gloss over the severity of what happened during the war, first by employing the euphemism of Naksa (or "setback") to describe what happened and later to celebrate the fact that "progressive" Arab regimes were not toppled by the Israeli army. Despite the significance of these events, the Arabic academic literature continues to lack a serious analysis of the events of June, 1967, in stark contrast to the hundreds of academic works published by Israeli and western authors. This reality necessitates a rereading of the war, and the formulation of a new Arab narrative about it, which the author attempts in this paper.

The basic hypothesis of the study is summarized in Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Middle East for as long as possible, and its various political, diplomatic, security, military, and economic activities to prevent Iran and any other country in the Middle East from obtaining nuclear weapons. The study examines Israel's policy, which calls for imposing the maximum international economic sanctions on Iran, manifested in its complete abandonment of the nuclear project or the overthrow of the Iranian regime. It presents Israel's policy towards the negotiations to return to the Iranian nuclear deal and the strategic confusion in which Israel finds itself due to many mistaken assumptions adopted by the Benjamin Netanyahu government regarding the Iranian nuclear project. It also discusses Israel's goals in the "war between wars" it wages against Iran and the major strategy against Iran advocated by the Israeli military establishment, as well as Israel's efforts to establish an Israeli-Arab-American military alliance against Iran. The study also presents the Israeli vision of the Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities and the risks and problems it faces.

This study provides a discussion and analysis of the circumstances that led to the military occupation of the core of the state and government in contemporary Algeria, and the ramifications for the process of building political and legal institutions, and the democratic transition experience. The study employs the concepts of populism and neopatrimonialism to paint a picture of the path taken by the government in Algeria since independence. Populism describes the ideology that sanctified the one-party state and revolutionary legitimacy, while neopatrimonialism is the resulting shape taken by the exercise of political power. Framing these two concepts within their historical context provides an understanding of the circumstances of the army's seizure of power and its identification with the state. It clarifies the reasons for its refusal to redistribute power within the society after the establishment of political pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.