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Beside the military and external challenges, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are facing serious domestic non-conventional challenges, i.e., the demands of political reform, social mobilization, demographic imbalance, environmental deterioration, resource depletion, the transformation and diversification in post-oil economy, terrorism and radicalization etc. In particular one of these new kinds of threats has started to be significant in the last decade. The massive immigration and demographic imbalance between local citizens and foreign residents in countries like the U.A.E, 10 percent; Qatar, 15 percent. This imbalance and the massive immigration into the GCC countries increased the vulnerability of these states, especially since it relates to other critical security issues such as human security (food security for example, in UAE is an example, the country import almost 95 percent of its food consuming) radicalization, energy security, and domestic unrest especially after 2011.

This paper addresses problematic aspects of the concept of "terrorism" from within its present-day setting, exploring the futile conflict between "terrorism" and "counter-terrorism" which has been utilized to marginalize the discourse on democracy, justice and national liberation. The paper argues that the categorization of an event as a terrorist act based on the identity of the perpetrator, and regardless of the victims, leads to a logical fallacy. One consequence of categorizing all armed acts by non-state actors as "terrorist" is the erosion of distinctions between terrorist acts and acts of national liberation, resistance to foreign occupation and armed opposition to state violence against civilians. One conclusion of the paper is that blurring the distinctions between terrorist and legitimate acts is counterproductive to the war on terror.

Victimization narratives compose a principle element in creating of sub-national identities in societies afflicted by divisions and communal disputes. Little wonder then that narratives of victimization abound in Kirkuk province, which lies at the heart of Iraq’s “disputed internal areas” problem. This paper starts of by analyzing the nature of victimization narratives and how they make use of the past to serve political projects spearheaded by political elites. It then turns to surveying and deconstructing the contending narratives propagated by communal elites in Kirkuk regarding the victimization, whether real or imagined, endured by the province’s demographic components – Kurds, Turkmens, Arabs and Christians. By analytically surveying the narratives of victimization of these four communities, this paper seeks to ascertain the workings of these narratives and to explicate the role they play.

اﺗﺴﻤﺖ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ازﻣﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﺔ وا ﻣﺎرات واﻟﺒﺤﺮﻳﻦ وﻣﺼﺮ، ﻓﻲ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺎﻟﻬﺪوء واﻟﺜﻘﺔ واﻻﺗﺰان. وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺐ أن ﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻘﻄﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮاﺣﻞ ا زﻣﺔ، ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﺠﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺼﺎر، ﻣﺮورًا ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺒﺮﻣﺠﺔ، ﻣﻦ دون اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ "ﻣﺎ ﺧﻠﻒ اﻟﻤﺸﻬﺪ". وإن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ دول اﻟﺤﺼﺎر ﻗﺪ ﺧﻄﻄﺖ ﻟﺘﻔﺠﻴﺮ ا زﻣﺔ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺟﻨﺢ اﻟﻈﻼم، ﻓﺠﺮ 24 أﻳﺎر/ ﻣﺎﻳﻮ 2017، ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮب "اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﻊ واﻟﺼﺪﻣﺔ" اﻣﻴﺮﻛﻲ، ﻓﺈن ﻗﻄﺮ ﺗﻤﻜﻨﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻣﺘﺼﺎص "اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ اوﻟﻰ"، ﺑﻼ ﻣﻔﺎﺟﺄة. وﺑﺎﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ داء اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ وردة ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ إزاء اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات واﻟﻤﻨﻌﻄﻔﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﺮت ﺑﻬﺎ ازﻣﺔ، ﻳُﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗ ﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﻬﺪوء، واﻟﺜﻘﺔ، واﻻﺗﺰان، اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺴﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ اداء اﻟﻘﻄﺮي، وﻫﺬه اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻫﻲ: ﺳﻘﻮط ﻋﻨﺼﺮ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﺟﺄة، وﺑﻨﺎء اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺮﺳﺎﻧﺔ "اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻨﺎﻋﻤﺔ"، وﺑﻨﺎء ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻔﺎت دوﻟﻴﺔ، وارﺗﺒﺎك اﻟﺨﺼﻢ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ازﻣﺔ اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺠﻴّﺔ، اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺮﻳﺔ، اﻟﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ. Since the outbreak of the crisis with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt on 24 May 2017, Qatar's diplomacy has been characterised by calm, confidence and balance. The observer can't understand the diplomatic approach of Qatar in dealing with all stages of the crisis - from explosion to siege, through state-orchestrated media campaigns - without knowing the "behind the scenes" facts. Blockading countries planned to blow the crisis up under the cover of darkness, before the dawn of May 24. But Qatar was, unsurprisingly, able to absorb the "shock and awe" first strike. Five factors characterise the country's diplomatic performance as it has reacted to developments and turning points in the crisis: The failure of the 'element of surprise', years of building Qatar's "nation brand", Qatar's arsenal of "soft power", international alliances, and the opponents' quandary.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

This study argues that the political system resulting from the post-2003 political process in Iraq contributed to the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities within a homogeneous political identity, without taking into account the multiplicity of ideological orientations within the minorities themselves. These minorities have become political minorities, but they are powerless and unable to change or influence the political decision-making process in Iraq. This means that political practice in Iraq, including general electoral practice, remained a practice based on the reproduction of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, and did not turn into a real political practice. In other words, the identity marker (sect, ethnicity, etc.) comes before the political manifesto. This political reality imposed on ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities a political behaviour represented in voting for their ethnic, religious and linguistic parties, just as they were in the one-party era.

This study discusses several hypotheses proposed by political culture literature, especially those that adopt a structural approach to understanding the relationship of social structures and institutions to actors, and the values generated by the nature of this relationship that inspire political action. The paper posits that research into the pattern of political culture arising from the relationship between social structures and actors is not limited to studying this direct relationship, but rather requires an examination of intermediary factors. Hence, the study outlines a supportive conceptual interpretive framework, through Pierre Bourdieu's Social Theory. It begins by reviewing the concepts discussed by Bourdieu to explain the relationship between social structures and actors. The second section presents a comparative analysis of concepts taken from political culture and those of Bourdieu that explain the emergence of political culture through the reciprocal relationship between social structures and actors. The third examines the outcomes of this comparison in light of the 2007 Palestinian political division.

Despite the sharp and often uncompromising rhetoric that accompanies it, Iran's foreign policy is deeply pragmatic and is guided by practical, strategic considerations and objectives. Especially after the end of the war with Iraq in 1989 , successive administrations in Tehran have pursued foreign policies that have been largely nonideological, guided more by the logic of national interests as dictated by evolving circumstances rather than by the principles of the 1978 - 79 revolution. Constitutionally, while the Supreme Leader is technically in overall charge of the country's international relations, Ayatollah Khamenei's guiding principles for conducting foreign policy – dignity, wisdom, and expediency – are broad enough to include a wide range of potential policy options. With the Islamic Republic seemingly embroiled in one regional and international crisis after another, pragmatism has become its default backup policy. A legacy of the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988 , this hard realism is only likely to be reinforced as the lingering consequences of the Twelve-Day War shape Iranian foreign and security policies in the years to come.

This study explore the concepts of populism and “the people,” linking them to ideology, hegemony, and the making of modern sport in Western liberal-capitalist democracies. While populism is widely seen as a useful way to understand oppositions between “the people” and elites, This study particularly interested here in what happens when self-styled populist political leaders actually govern, ostensibly on the people’s behalf. To illustrate this, the study consider two examples of self-styled populist leaders from different eras – Benito Mussolini and Donald Trump – that have used sport to promote narrow, ideologically laden, conceptions of “the people.” Through these examples the study argue that the concept of populism on its own does not provide a comprehensive understanding of political and cultural struggles in sport today, nor does it provide adequate guidelines for oppositional political strategies.

The study takes up the topic of the evolution of Hamas' military action from the foundation of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades between 1987 and 1992, the movement's military wing, and beyond, drawing upon memoirs and testimonies of the movement's political and military leaders in Palestine and on available data regarding military confrontations with the Israeli occupation. The study starts from the assumption that the evolution of Hamas's military action as an active "agent" in the region differs across the different stages of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and with the development of the movement's political thought and relations with regional and international systems on the other. These stages have been formational of the movement's variable identity, one that has led it to defining its regional interest and role on the basis of military strength. It transformed into a "semi-classical" army in Gaza specifically, after having been a movement of modestly equipped and armed groupings, as it continues to be to this day in the West Bank. This study attempts to monitor this evolution across the successive confrontations with the Israeli occupation in the wars of 2008, 2012 and 2014.