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The June, 1967 War was a turning point in the modern history not only of Palestine and the Zionist state but also the wider region. The defeat of the Arab armies was a pivotal moment for the modern and contemporary histories of the Arab world, and has consequences which continue to reverberate today. That fact remains unchanged despite attempts by Arab governments to gloss over the severity of what happened during the war, first by employing the euphemism of Naksa (or "setback") to describe what happened and later to celebrate the fact that "progressive" Arab regimes were not toppled by the Israeli army. Despite the significance of these events, the Arabic academic literature continues to lack a serious analysis of the events of June, 1967, in stark contrast to the hundreds of academic works published by Israeli and western authors. This reality necessitates a rereading of the war, and the formulation of a new Arab narrative about it, which the author attempts in this paper.

ﺗﺒﻨ ﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﻮن اوروﺑﻴﻮن واﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﻮن واÈ ﻋﻼم واﻟﺮأي اﻟﻌﺎم، ﺑﺤﻤﺎسٍ، ﺳﻨﺔ 2011، ﻣﺎ ﺳُ ﻤﻲ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ. وﺗﻌﻬﺪ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد ا وروﺑﻲ ﺑﺪﻋﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺤﻮّل اﻟﺤﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﺑﺴﺨﺎء. وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻟﻢ ﻳﺮقَاوروﺑﻴﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى وﻋﻮدﻫﻢ؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ودوﻟﻪ اﻋﻀﺎء، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّل اﻟﺜﻮرات اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ واﻟﺤﺮب اﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان، واﺳﺘﻌﺎدة اﻟﺤﻜﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻓﻲ أﺧﺮى، إﻟﻰ ﻣﺘﻔﺮﺟﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ ﻋﻮارض ازﻣﺔ ﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻟﺘﻄﻮرات. وﺑﺪﻟ ﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﺆﺛ ﺮ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ أﻃﻠﻘﻬﺎ اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، أﺛ ﺮت ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪﻳﻨﺎﻣﻴﺎت ﺑﻘﻮة ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ. ﺗﺤﻠﻞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻣﻨﺎﻫﺞ اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اوروﺑﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ "اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ"، وأدواﺗﻪ ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ، وأوﻟﻮﻳﺎﺗﻪ، وﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮّﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺪى اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻴﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اورﺑﻲ، اﻟﺮﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻲ، ﺗﻮﻧﺲ. In 2011, European politicians, diplomats, media, and publics enthusiastically embraced the so-called Arab Spring. Te EU pledged to generously support transformation processes initiated in the region. Yet, Europeans – as other third parties – have not lived up to their promises. Against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings turning into violence and civil war in some countries and authoritarian restoration in others, the EU and its member states have been largely reduced to being bystanders, dealing with the symptoms of crises rather than impacting – let alone shaping – the path of developments. Indeed, rather than the EU impacting on the dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring, these dynamics have strongly impacted on Europe. In order to explain this phenomenon, this paper analyzes the EU's approaches, instruments and priorities – and how the latter have changed over the course of the last years.

​Arab narratives of the June, 1967 War remained limited in scope even today, 50 years after the cessation of hostilities. “The June, 1967 War” was held in Doha, Qatar from June 20-22, 2017, the three-day meeting was devoted to studying the events of the war and its ongoing repercussions through the prisms of military history and strategic analysis.

​Arab narratives of the June, 1967 War remained limited in scope even today, 50 years after the cessation of hostilities. “The June, 1967 War” was held in Doha, Qatar from June 20-22, 2017, the three-day meeting was devoted to studying the events of the war and its ongoing repercussions through the prisms of military history and strategic analysis.

ﺗﺪﻋﻲ اﻟﺮواﻳﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺮﺳﻤﻴﺔ أن ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967 اﻧﺪﻟﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ وﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﺨﻄﻂ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺳﻠﻔ ﺎ، وﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺪﻗﻴﻘﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮة اﻟﻤﺘﻨﺎﺛﺮة ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﺻﺪر ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺒﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ وﻣﺬﻛﺮات ودراﺳﺎت ووﺛﺎﺋﻖ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ؛ ﺗﺮﺳﻢ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﻨﺎﻗﻀﺔ ﺗﻤﺎﻣًﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻻدﻋﺎء. ﺗﻌﺎﻟﺞ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ ﻓﻲ إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻗﺮارات اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈ ﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ، وﻫﻲ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﻮﻟﺔ رﺳﻤﻴًﺎ وﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴًﺎ اﺗﺨﺎذَ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب، ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ودورﻫﺎ اﻟﺤﺎﺳﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻨﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺤﺮب ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻄ ﺎ وﺗﺼﻌﻴﺪًا؛ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺳﻌﺖ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻟﺨﻠﻖ اﻟﻔﺮﺻﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﺸﻦ اﻟﺤﺮب ورﻓﻀﺖ أي ﺣﻞ ﺳﻠﻤﻲ ﻟÑزﻣﺔ، واﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻻﺗﺨﺎذ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺮار. وﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻮاﻣﻞ ﺗﺄﺛﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺮار ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ، واﻟﺨﻄﻂ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺿﻌﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ارﻛﺎن اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ اÈﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻐﺮض ﺗﻮﺳﻴﻊ ﺣﺪود إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﺣﺮب ﺣﺰﻳﺮان/ ﻳﻮﻧﻴﻮ 1967، إﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻞ، ﻟﻴﻔﻲ إﺷﻜﻮل. Te official Israeli narrative of the June 1967 War depicts the country as having been dragged unwillingly into a conflict for which it had not planned. A close inspection of a number of detailed sources, scattered across a variety of published Hebrew materials, paint a picture entirely at odds with such a claim however. In this paper, the author addresses the Israeli decision to go to war in June 1967 by examining the steps taken by the Israeli government—legally, the only body mandated to declare war. Te author also examines the developments in the stance taken by the Israeli military command, which was instrumental in the decision to go to war. At the time, the Israeli military worked to create the right opportunity to declare war, refusing to accept any attempts at a peaceful resolution of the conflict and coerced the government into war through a variety of means.