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This study investigates the circumstances under which military governments leave power. It shows that there is no single path to get the military out of power, as there are no general rules for all cases. Nevertheless, several lessons are learned of which the most important is that military officers never relinquish power on their own. Rather, they are usually forced to leave it. In most cases, forcing the military to hand over authority requires a democratic opposition bloc that reaches a national consensus and agrees on a clear political strategy with an explicit goal. This will get the military out of power and establish a civilian government. A consensus or democratic bloc enables reformist democrats to change the balance of power for the benefit of democratic transition.

​In this section you will find the most important documents on democratic change in the Arab world. In this issue, we publish documents highlighting the political movement in Tunisia demanding democracy and look at the main political changes in Sudan, Iraq and Jordan in March and April 2022.

​This article analyses the development of civil-military relations in Ethiopia and how they are affected by politics, culture and ethnicity whilst drawing on compatibility theory. It explores a fundamental issue: to what extent does ethnic and cultural diversity influence civil-military relations in Ethiopia? The article begins with the hypothesis that the military's interests and political affiliations arise from their vision of the nation-state's interest, and may conflict with the attitudes of civil institutions, complicating the separation between civil and military institutional mandates. The article demonstrates how the social structure and distribution of tribes has had an impact on the reform processes of successive political systems in Ethiopia. Moreover, it concludes that consensus in civil-military relations and civilian control of government will continue in the future if slogans of centralization and citizenship are actualized through legal and democratic methods based on the principles of justice and equality in rights and duties among all constituents.

The study criticizes the general framework that has governed the broader current of the researchers in civil-military relations, their method of thinking about the military institution since the inception of the field, the paper presents the theoretical and practical gaps in that literature, in particular the researchers of "Coup-Proofing". The study shows the weakness of the explanatory capabilities of the field in extrapolating and analyzing the historical era that the research seeks to reveal its theoretical and historical ambiguities, which is the phase of political pluralism in Syria between 1954 - 1958 , which the researchers viewed as a democratic phase. The paper examines why did the army step down from the presidency and allowed civil forces to engage in political action at the time, in spite of that phase is in the midst of two series of coups. The paper is based on a basic premise that the army as a military institution do represent wings, sectors, units, brigades, and power relations, before it is an expression of any other social segments, which is in contrast to what the literature says in examining the sociological backgrounds of the officers.

​This study fits into a broad category of scholarship concerned with transitional periods in various political systems. Specifically, it examines the political transition in post-revolutionary Tunisia since 2011. It does so by comparing the legal provisions of the post-revolutionary transition - the major texts, which define the transitional stage - and the political realities, which take the shape of events, actions and political discourse. A point of particular focus is the 2011 elections to the National Constituent Assembly, which the author analyzes through the rubric of "electoral engineering". One more conclusion of the paper is that electoral engineering remains a feature of Tunisian politics, although it has gone from "authoritarian electoral engineering" to "democratic electoral engineering," reflecting changes which have taken in the country as a whole.

ﺗﺒﺤﺚ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺮض اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ا ﻟﺰاﻣﻴﺔ وﺧﻄﻮات ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬﻫﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼث دولٍ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻟﺪول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ؛ ﻗﻄﺮ، وا ﻣﺎرات، واﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، واﻟﺘﻲ أﻋﺎدت ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ دام ﺧﻤﺴﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻋﺎﻣًﺎ. وﺗﻔﺴﺮ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة، ﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ اﻟﻬﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﺒﺎب، وﺑﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻴﺤﻪ ﻟﻘﻮات اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎط ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺎﺗﺖ ﻣﺆﺧﺮًا أﻛﺜﺮ ﻧﺸﺎﻃ ﺎ ﺧﺎرج ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ، ﻓﻀﻠ ﺎ ﻋﻦ أن اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻄﺐ وﻳﺪرب ﺷﺒﺎﻧ ﺎ ﻏﺎﻟﺒًﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﺘﻘﺮون إﻟﻰ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻢ، وﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮن ﻋﺎﻃﻠﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻣﻌﺘﻠﻲ اﻟﺼﺤﺔ. ﻛﻠﻤﺎت ﻣﻔﺘﺎﺣﻴﺔ: ﻗﻄﺮ، اﻣﺎرات، اﻟﻜﻮﻳﺖ، اﻟﺘﺠﻨﻴﺪ اﻟﺰاﻣﻲ. This article explores the introduction and implementation of mandatory military service, in three of the six Gulf monarchies that constitute the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Two of these states, Qatar and the UAE, have never before imposed conscription while the third, Kuwait, decided to reintroduce it after a fifteen-year hiatus. The new policy, the essay argues, has been motivated by several reasons. First, conscription will build up the reserve forces of these states that have recently become more active in projecting military power beyond their borders. Second, it will strengthen national identity and the political socialization of young men and, to a lesser extent, women. Third, it will engage and train often poorly educated, unemployed, and unhealthy youths. Finally, the article contends, there is little chance of compulsory military service being introduced in the other three GCC states.

Military interventions in Sudanese politics can be attributed to a number of factors, most pertinently: excessive politicization throughout society, social institutions, trades unions and syndicates as well as educational and religious institutions. In this sense, the Sudanese was not an exception, merely one of many highly politicized institutions. This paper concludes that the three different military coups which took power in Sudan were only able to do so with the aiding and abetting of civilian political forces, such as the National Umma Party, the Islamic Front and an array of leftist forces all—to varying extents—colluded with the military to further their political aims. With the military ranks reflecting wider societal politicization, military coups were effectively an extension of the political process by other means.

By analysing qualitative and archival primary sources, this paper examines intra-military relations in Syria during the period in which Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (1961 - 1963). It explores the consequences of the failure to apply what can be described as "Concordance Theory", particularly regarding the impact of military divisions on civil-military relations, and how these divisions led to dangerous fragmentation within the military institution itself. Additionally, it examines the role these divisions played in the disintegration of the political system during the secession, without neglecting the social and political conditions that influenced these developments. The paper highlights the emergence of the Damascene 'Shwam' officers' faction as a result of policies aimed at containing and dismantling military factions during the unity period, and how this faction managed to lead the secession coup. It also analyses how this elite failed to maintain control over the army and government institutions, with their efforts to assert control giving rise to competing coup factions, ultimately leading to the collapse of military leadership and the loss of command and control. This paved the way for the military coup on 8 March 1963.

This study attempts to understand the concept of the "deep state" given its increasing use in political literature and analysis. This happens especially in comparative studies and, specifically, when multiple political systems are addressed. Through an analysis of the literature in which the term is used, it is clear that the concept of the "deep state" is ambiguously understood and applied. This study is based on a critical view of the concept. It assumes that the vagueness of its definition is tinged with secrecy. Its fragmented usage in a variety of political systems (democratic, semi-democratic and authoritarian), render it an analytical tool that is not useful nor capable to expand knowledge of comparative political science. In lieu of this hypothesis, the study reveals discrepancies in the usage of the concept of "deep state", in an attempt to refine the concept.

​​This study examines the redefinition of civil–military relations in Sudan, arguing that the prevailing approach in the country reduces these relations to the issue of military reform and reduces that reform to preventing the army from carrying out a coup, removing it from politics, or restricting its economic activity. The study begins with a critique of Samuel Huntington's traditional theory and presents alternative approaches that advocate integrating the military into society and expanding its roles under civilian control. It also offers a typology of armies based on four models according to their political and economic engagement, applying this framework to the Sudanese army and its transformations since the independence (1955). The study concludes that building a more sustainable relationship requires rethinking the framework that shapes civil–military relations in Sudan. It calls for involving military personnel in formulating national policies and regulating their economic activities through governance in ways that strengthen national security and support the political process.​